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( ALRE ORD) 
THE 
REMECOURT LAW CLERK s 
o 
CHARLES J Y DE GROOT and 
DE GROOT ARMS, L ., 
Plaintiff: unlerdefendan ~~~~~~~--­ppellan 
-v -
J\NDLEYTRENCHlNG, 
dfb/aSf LEY 
and 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-
It pond nt, 
J. HOULE FILS, IN , a 
Canadian corporation, 
Defendant-Re pondent. 
pp aled from the Oi trict of th Third Judicial Di trid 
for the tate of Idaho in aod for anyoo ouofy 
Honorable GREGORY M. C LET District Judge 
Kevin E. Dinius and Michael J. Hanby IT 
DINIUS LAW 
Attorn ys for ppellants 
M. Michael Sasser 
SASSER & INGliS, PC 
Robert D. Lewis 
CANTRILL SKINNER SULIJV AN & KING LLP 
,.f ' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDA.l-lO 
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT and 
DE GROOT FARMS, LLC., 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-
Appellants, 
-vs-
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., 
d/b/a STANDLEY & CO., 
And 
Defendant -Counterclaimant-
Respondent, 
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., a 
Canadian corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39406-2011 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET, Presiding 
Kevin E. Dinius and Michael J. Hanby II, DINIUS LAW 
Attorneys for Appellants 
M. Michael Sasser, SASSER & INGLIS, PC. 
Robert D. Lewis, CANTRILL SKINNER SULLIVAN & KING LLP. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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-Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a ) 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~ 
INC., a Canadian corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Counterdefendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------) ) 
Case No. CV 2001-7777 
AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS 
IN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AND ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIM 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FORA W ARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
): ss 
County of Ada ) 
ROBERT D. LEWIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the attorney of record for the Counterclaimant, Standley Trenching, Inc., 
d/b/a Standley & Co., and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit. 
2. That a Judgment was entered in favor of the Counterclaimant in the above entitled 
action on or about April 4, 2005. 
3. That pursuant to said Judgment there is now due and owing by the Counterdefendants 
Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC to the Counterclaimant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a 
Standley & Co., in the sum of$20,259.57. 
4. That pursuant to Rule 69 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, I have calculated the 
prejudgment interest due on the Judgment amount entered in this action, which was 12.0%, from 
March 16, 2001 through and including April 4, 2005, which calculates out to be $6.66 per diem. 
5. That the calculated prejudgment interest accrued on the Judgment entered in this 
action is at the rate of accruing interest of 12% per annum ($6.66 per diem) from March 16, 2001 
to April 4, 2005 is $9,856.80. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR A WARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 2 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
Robert D. Lewis 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this I~y of April, 2005. 
NO ARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at ~_ fi::> I 
Commission Expires 101d?iI09 ( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,,--
I hereby certify that on the L::L day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa,ID 83687 
William A. McCurdy 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. Kelly 
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC 
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FORA W ARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 3 
Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
.... CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
C 1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 ~ Boise, Idaho 83701 
(!) Telephone: (208) 344-8035 ii2 Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
o Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ST AND LEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a ) 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~ 
J 
) INC., a Canadian corporation, 
Defendants. ) 
----------------------------) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT ~ 
FARMS, LLC, ) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
------------------------------) ) 
Case No. CV 2001-7777 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY 
FEES 
COMES NOW The Counterclaim ant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co., by and 
through its counsel of record, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King LLP, 
and pursuant to the Judgement on Counterclaim issued by the Court in this matter on April 4, 2005 
and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e), hereby submits to this Court Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 1 
as a true and correct accounting of attorney fees incurred by Counterclaimant in pursuit of the 
Counterclaim. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
For itemization, please refer to Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
TOTAL FEES ........................................................ $8,359.00 
Attorney 
Paralegal 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
$8,268.00 
$ 9l.00 
Robert D. Lewis, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am familiar with the attorneys fees expended in prosecution of the Counterclaim in 
this case, and set forth the amount herein which is computed upon an hourly basis, 
considering the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, and the experience and ability of 
the attorney in the particular field of law, and prevailing charges for like work, the 
amount involved and results obtained, and awards in similar cases. 
2. The basis for computing the attorneys fees herein is at an hourly rate of $130.00 for 
Robert D. Lewis, attorney, and $65.00 for paralegal Mary L. Hainline. 
3. The Counterclaim arose from a commercial transaction. Attorneys fees are allowed 
to the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The defense to the 
Counterclaim was also pursued within the provisions of Idaho Code § 12-121, since 
there was no merit to the claim that there was no amount due on open account. 
4. The attorneys fees stated herein constitute a full, true and correct statement 
summarizing Counterclaimant's reasonable attorneys fees expended in this action, 
each item having been actually and necessarily incurred, and your affiant alleges on 
information and belief that said attorneys fees are in compliance with Rule 54, 
I.R. C.P., and allowed on the Judgment on Counterclaim issued by this Court on April 
4,2005. 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 2 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
Robert D. Lewis 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this JE!iay of April, 2005. 
.0t~~~~+ 
SERRANO ~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO 't 
.' .'"c··~"':';'~~~''''''iil,IJ'-;l,.J. 
~(;V:1ft&G~tu~~ 
Nolstry Pub~ic for Idaho 
Residing atC33 OWQ {D . 
Commission Expires: ;> 10 by; 101 
~I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the 15th day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
William A. McCurdy 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. Kelly 
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC 
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[X] 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES - Page 3 
06 
Exhibit "A" 
11/8/2002 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about view of Department of 
Agriculture documents; prepare letter to Kelly about Standley 
documents; view Department of Agriculture documents. 
11/12/2002 RDL Telephone conference with K. Trainor about defense; prepare letter to 
M. Kelly about SUbstitution of counsel. 
11/13/2002 RDL Telephone conference with A Ward about meeting electricians; 
telephone conference with J. Grigg; telephone conference with M. Kelly. 
11/14/2002 RDL Prepare letter to Continental Western about fee reimbursement and 
clarification of insurers reservations. 
11/18/2002 RDL Review deposition notices and letter from plaintiffs counsel; telephone 
conference with K. Trainor. 
11/19/2002 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about case strategy; telephone 
conference with J. Grigg; telephone conference with A. Ward 
cancelling meeting; telephone conference with K. Standley about case 
status. 
11/25/2002 RDL Review Standley motion for summary judgment, memorandum, 
affidavit and notice of hearing; prepare letter to K. Standley about 
summary jUdgment; prepare letter to K. Standley about Houle's 
position; review Houle's discovery responses. 
11/27/2002 RDL Telephone conference with K. Trainor about case status. 
12/212002 RDL Review letter from plaintiffs counsel about depositions. 
12/3/2002 RDL Review plaintiffs motion to amend complaint; prepare motion to amend 
counterclaim; prepare letter to Kurt Standley. 
12/4/2002 RDL Telephone conference with K. Trainer about case status. 
12/6/2002 RDl Review letter from Kelly to plaintiffs counsel about deposition dates. 
12/10/2002 RDL Review plaintiffs memorandum, affidavit, and Rule 56(f) affidavit 
opposing Standley's motion for summary judgment 
12111/2002 RDL Telephone conference with Judge Culet's clerk; telephone conference 
with M. Kelly about vacating pretrial conference. 
12/12/2002 RDL Telephone conference with K. Trainer about trial vacated; prepare letter 
to insurer about fee reimbursement; telephone conference with K. 
Standley about case status. 
12/16/2002 RDL Telephone conference with plaintiffs counsel about stipulation to 
amend pleadings; review stipulation; telephone conference with M. 
Kelly about stipulation. 
1/9/2003 RDL Prepare letter to B. McCammon about insurance payment. 
1/17/2003 RDL Prepare letter to K. Standley about billing and case status. 
1 
007 
299.00 
52.00 
52.00 
39.00 
52.00 
78.00 
104.00 
26.00 
39.00 
104.00 
13.00 
26.00 
39.00 
39.00 
104.00 
91.00 
26.00 
39.00 
3/31/2003 RDL st for trial setting; telephone confere 
; prepare response to request for trial 
4/10/2003 RDL Review order setting trial; prepare letter to K. Standley. 
4/14/2003 RDL Telephone conference with K. Standley about case status. 
4/15/2003 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about deposition dates; review 
scheduling stipulation and return to Kelly. 
4/23/2003 RDL Review deposition notices for Standley, Griggs, and HartZelL 
4/25/2003 RDL Review Standley's responses to request for admissions and fully 
executed stipulation for discovery. 
4/29/2003 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about deposition schedule. 
M. 
5/2/2003 RDL Review letter from Kelly to plaintiffs counsel with deposition notices for 
C. DeGroot and E. DeGroot; telephone conference with M. Kelly. 
5/6/2003 RDL Review letter with stipulation and order to dismiss K. Standley; prepare 
letter to K Trainor; telephone conference with M. Kelly. 
5/8/2003 RDL Review amended complaint and proposed answer, and prepare 
counterclaim. 
5/19/2003 RDL Review conformed copy of Standley answer and counter-claim; 
prepare letter to K. Trainer. 
7/7/2003 RDL Telephone conference with K. Standley about case status; Prepare 
letter to M. Kelly about moving case forward; Prepare letter to K. 
Standley about return of retainer and agreement to pay. 
7/9/2003 RDL Telephone conference with Plaintiffs counsel and M. Kelly about 
deposition schedule. 
8/15/2003 RDL Review letter from discovery counsel to Kelly and Kelly's response 
letter. Telephone conference with M. Kelly about vacated depositions. 
9/25/2003 RDL Review reply to co-counsel; prepare letter to K. Standley. 
10/15/2003 RDL Review amended deposition notices of K. Standley, J. Griggs and T. 
Hatzell. 
10/23/2003 RDL Review letter from Plaintiffs counsel vacating C. DeGrout deposition. 
Telephone conference with Kent Stanley about case status. 
11/12/2003 RDL Attend deposition of E. DeGroot; prepare letter to K. Standley with 
deposition summary. 
11/26/2003 RDL Review pretrial conference rescheduling. 
12/17/2003 RDL Review motion for protective order and notice of hearing. 
12/19/2003 RDL Travel to and from Caldwell; attend pretrial conference. 
12/31/2003 RDL Prepare letter to Kurt about new trial date. 
2 
78.00 
52.00 
26.00 
39.00 
39.00 
39.00 
26.00 
52.00 
65.00 
104.00 
39.00 
78.00 
26.00 
39.00 
39.00 
39.00 
39.00 
598.00 
26.00 
26.00 
260.00 
39.00 
1/5/2004 RDL Review order ation and order on pretrial conferen 
1/26/2004 RDL Conference with Standley, Griggs and Hartzell at M. Kelly's office; file 
review and prepare for C. DeGroot deposition. 
1/27/2004 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly; attend deposition of C. DeGroot; 
prepare deposition summary. 
2/2/2004 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about Standley and Company 
depositions. 
2/24/2004 RDL Telephone conference 'v'Vith Plaintiffs counsel about mediation; prepare 
letter to Plaintiffs counsel about trial schedule. 
2/25/2004 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about case status. 
2/26/2004 RDL Review C. DeGroot deposition transcript regarding possible summary 
judgment. 
3/11/2004 RDL Review Houle's motion to compel. 
3/15/2004 RDL Prepare letter to M. Kelly about mediatiop. 
3/17/2004 RDL Review letter from Houle's counsel about vacating mediation; Telephone 
conference with M. Kelly about mediation cancellation; prepar!? mediatfon 
statement. 
3/19/2004 RDL Review letter from Plaintiffs counsel about new mediation date; review 
Hooper report; prepare letter to K. Standley_ 
3/22/2004 RDL Telephone conference with P. Dougherty about acquiring a stipulation and 
order dismissing Kurt Standley, individually; prepare letter to K. Trainer. 
4/15/2004 MLH Calculate prejudgment interest and forward mediation statement to Mike 
Kelley for review. 
4/19/2004 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about mediation; revise mediation 
statement; Telephone conference with K. Standley about mediation. 
4/21/2004 RDL Prepare for and attend mediation; travel to and from Nampa. 
4/27/2004 RDL Prepare exhibit list and witness list; prepare letter to M. Kelly. 
4/30/2004 RDL Telephone conference with M. Kelly about possible settlement. 
5/312004 RDL Telephone conference with Kurt about settlement possibilities and trial 
strategy. 
5/6/2004 RDL Travel to and from Caldwell; attend pretrial conference with Judge Culet. 
5/13/2004 RDL Review order setting trial for October 25,2004 (10days). 
5/26/2004 RDL Review offer of judgment. 
6/28/2004 RDL Review order resetting trial for April 25, 2005. 
12/8/2004 RDL Review Houle request for supplemental responses to discovery. 
117/2005 RDL Telephone conference with K. Standley about summary judgment; 
telephone conference with M. Kelly about vacating trial; file review 
regarding Summary Judgment preparation; prepare letter to M. Kelly 
about Beltman deposition; prepare motion for Summary Judgment; 
prepare memo supporting motion for Summary Judgment. 
3 
39.00 
312.00 
884.00 
52.00 
39.00 
13.00 
52.00 
26.00 
26.00 
130.00 
78.00 
39.00 
19.50 
91.00 
806.00 
156.00 
26.00 
26'.00 
312.00 
26.00 
13.00 
26.00 
26.00 
273.00 
1/12/2005 RDL Research Idaho law with action on open account; memo 
in Summary J , telephone conference with K. Standley; prepare 
affidavit of K. Standley; prepare letter to K. Standley. 
1/24/2005 MLH Draft witness disclosure. 
1/27/2005 RDL Revise and final Summary Judgment materials. 
1/28/2005 RDL Prepare notice of hearing on Summary Judgment. 
21112005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Review Standley memorandum on Summary Judgment for case-in-chief. 
2/15/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Review DeGroot's response to motion for Summary Judgment; research 
regarding Idaho case law on burden of non-moving party to establish 
issue of fact. 
2/17/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Prepare reply memo on Summary Judgment. 
2/18/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Final reply memo on Motion for StJmmary Judgment on counterclaim. 
2/24/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Review M. Kelly reply memo on Standby motion for Summary Judgment. 
3/112005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Prepare for hearing on Summary Judgment; travel to and from Caldwell; 
attend hearing on Summary Judgment; telephone conference with K. 
Trainer. 
3/7/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Telephone conference with K. Standley about summary judgment ruling. 
3/18/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Telephone conference with M. Kelly about attendance at pre-trial 
conference. 
3/21/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Prepare for and attend telephone status conference with court and 
Plaintiffs counsel. 
RDL Attorney Fee: 
Review DeGroot's motion to vacate trial setting. 
3/29/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Review order confirming Summary Judgment. 
3/29/2005 MLH Paralegal 
Draft judgment. 
3/30/2005 RDL Attorney Fee: 
Finalize judgment on counterclaim; prepare letter to court; prepare letter 
to K. Standley. . 
4 
1.0 
338.00 
26.00 
104.00 
39.00 
52.00 
156.00 
156.00 
91.00 
52.00 
494.00 
26.00 
26.00 
104.00 
39.00 
39.00 
45.50 
91.00 
Total $8,359.00 
Robert D. Lewis 
Mary L. Hainline 
SUMMARY 
63.60 @ 
1.40 @ 
5 
$130Ihr 
$651hr 
$8,268.00 
$ 91.00 
$8,359.00 
Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a ) 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~ 
INC., a Canadian corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
----------------------------) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT 
FARMS,LLC, 
Counterdefendants. 
) 
, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) ) 
Case No. CV 2001-7777 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AND ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW The Counterclaimant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co., by and 
through its counsel of record, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King LLP, 
and pursuant to the Judgement on Counterclaim issued by the Court in this matter on April 4, 2005, 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1 
hereby moves this Honorable Court for an Order awarding prejudgment interest on the sum of 
$20,259.57, accruing at the statutory rate of 12% per annum from March 16,2001 to April 4, 2005, 
the entry date of Judgment on Counterclaim, totaling $9,856.80. 
Counterclaimant further moves this Honorable Court for issuance of an Amended Judgment 
itemizing the prejudgment interests allowable by law. 
This motion is made and based upon the records and pleadings on file in the above-entitled 
matter, together with the Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, filed of even date herewith. 
-DATED this ~ day of April, 2005. 
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
By:jg~~; 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, 
Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM - Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"-
I hereby certify that on the t.5- day of April, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa,ID 83687 
\Villiam A. McCurdy 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. Kelly 
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC 
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #27l3 
CANTRILL, SKJ}·rNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS,LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a ) 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & FILS, ~ 
INC., a Canadian corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Counterdefendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------) ) 
Case No. CV 2001-7777 
ORDER 
On May 31, 2005, this Court heard oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
Judgment on Counterclaim, Standley Trenching Inc.'s Motion for Prejudgment Interest and Entry 
of Amended Judgment on Counterclaim, and Standley Trenching Inc.'s Motion for Rule 54(b) 
Certificate. Plaintiff appeared by way of counsel, Jill S. Holinka. Counterclaimant Standley 
ORDER - Page 1 
o 
Trenching Inc., appeared by counsel Robert D. Lewis. Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc., appeared 
by way of counsel William A. McCurdy. Having reviewed the record in this case and heard oral 
argument, the Court enters the following Orders: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Judgment on Counterclaim is DENIED. 
2. Counterclaimant's Motion to add a Rule 54(b) Certificate is DENIED, as it is 
premature, although the matter may be taken up again if the status of the case 
changes. 
3. Counterclaimant's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is entered for the period of March 
16,2001 to April 4, 2005, with the amount of$9,856.80 found due and owing at the 
statutory rate, and this issue may be taken up later, when the status of the case 
changes. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 
I 
ORDER - Page 2 
01.6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Jill Holinka 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
William A. McCurdy 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. Kelly 
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC 
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
CANTRILL, SKJ1'..TNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
Case No. CV 2001-7777 
COUNTERCLAIMANT 
CLERK 
STANDLEY TRENCHING. INC., d/b/a ) 
STANDLEY & CO., and 1. HOULE & FILS, ~ 
INC., a Canadian corporation, ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF FEES 
Defendants. ) 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
CHARLES DeGROOT; AND DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Counterdefendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------------) ) 
COMES NOW Counterclaim ant, Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co., 
("Standley"), by and through its attorneys of record, Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP, and 
hereby presents this Memorandum to the Court in support of its claim for attorneys fees on the 
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
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Counterclaim. Following the hearing on Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs held June 29, this Court gave 
all parties an opportunity to file a Supplemental Memorandum on or before July 22, 2005. 
At the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench that (1) this Counterclaim is based upon a 
commercial transaction, and (2) there is a statute that governs attorneys fees applying to this matter, 
Idaho Code § 12-120. The Court also ruled that (3) Counterclaimant Standley was a prevailing party, 
and that Standley also prevailed against Plaintiff on its defenses to the Complaint. Summary 
Judgment has been issued to Standley both on the Counterclaim and against all claims made by 
Plaintiff DeGroot. 
The question presented by the Court that is addressed by this Memorandum is whether 
Standley can be the prevailing party for an award of attorneys fees or costs, when this action has been 
consolidated with a new suit filed by DeGroot versus Beltman. Standley is a Third Party Defendant 
in the DeGroot v. Beltman case under a Third Party Complaint filed by Beltman. 
As the Court knows from the position set forth by Standley at the hearing, the consolidation 
was acquired without notice or opportunity to be heard by Counterclaimant/Defendant Standley. 
Although the exact circumstances of the stipulation are unknown to the undersigned, apparently 
DeGroot counsel stipulated with Beltman counsel to consolidate the actions. Standley reserves the 
right to contest that consolidation at a later time. For purposes of this Memorandum, and as will be 
seen by the argument below, Standley does not believe that the consolidation is material to the 
question of prevailing party and costs in the initial action between DeGroot and Standley. 
Rule 54(d)(1)(B), I.R.C.P., provides the Court with the basis for determining which party 
to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs. As the rule states "the trial court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and 
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF FEES- Page 2 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Counterclaim ant perceives that the Court is reluctant to now award attorney fees because of 
his concern about the effect of the DeGroot v. Beltman lawsuit on liabilities of DeGroot and 
Standley. 
In the first place, that concern can be overcome by interpretation of the express language in 
the Civil Rule. The use of the term "action" is determinative. Rule 2 defines action, and states that 
"there shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action." Rule 3( a) (1 ) states that "a civil 
action is commenced by a filing of a complaint with the Court, .... No claim, controversy or dispute 
may be submitted to any court in the state for determination or judgment without filing a Complaint 
" 
DeGroot v. Standley is one action. That action has resulted in a Judgment awarded to 
Standley on the Counterclaim. That action has resulted in a Summary Judgment in favor of Standley 
against all claims asserted by DeGroot in its Complaint. Regardless of any other action that has been 
or may be filed by DeGroot against any other entity, it is only the result ofthe DeGroot v. Standley 
action that is pertinent to this Court's decision on whether to award costs and attorneys fees to 
Standley. 
The DeGroot v. Beltman action is entirely separate from the action in which Standley now 
seeks costs and attorneys fees. DeGroot did not prevail against Standley. Whether Beltman prevails 
against Standley in the DeGroot v. Beltman action is irrelevant. This situation has been addressed 
by one federal court. Defendant's costs can be assessed against a Plaintiff, when not the prevailing 
party, even when another Plaintiff does prevail in an action consolidated for trial. Modick v. Carvel 
COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
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Stores of New York. Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361 (D. N.Y. 1962). 
Even though consolidated, the two actions that are of concern to this Court are separate and 
apart. At issue are costs and attorneys fees in the action initiated by DeGroot against Standley and 
Houle. The rules set forth above contemplate that this Court only consider the results in this action 
in determining which party is a prevailing party and entitled to costs and fees. Filing the DeGroot 
v. Beltman action does not save DeGroot from a fee award. Nor does consolidating the two separate 
actions. 
Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the Court finds some reason to overlook 
the meaning of "action," consolidation should not playa factor in determining who is the prevailing 
party between DeGroot and Standley. 
DeGroot chose to sue Standley in the DeGroot v. Standlev action. Standley Counterclaimed 
against DeGroot in the DeGroot v. Standlev action. Those claims are final for all intents and 
purposes, aithough the Court has yet to certify them as final because Houle remains as a party in the 
DeGroot v. Standley action. 
There is no potential for offset in the DeGroot v. BeItman case of a fee award to Standley. 
There is no legal basis for DeGroot to make any claim against Standley. Nor should such an offset 
be made between Beltman and Standley, since Beltman is not a party to the DeGroot v. Standley 
action. 
Also, a claim of offset requires that DeGroot prevail against Beltman in the DeGroot v. 
Beltman case. Such a recovery is no more than mere speculation, since Beltman has valid defenses 
against DeGroot's claims. If DeGroot does not prevail, there can be no argument for offset. When 
Beltman prevails against DeGroot, DeGroot should be paying costs and attorneys fees to Beltman. 
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Assuming that DeGroot does prevail against Beltman, then an offset would arise only if 
Beltman recovers against Standley. Standley has valid defenses against any claim for indemnity or 
contribution by Beltman. When Standley prevails, Beltman will not. 
The possible results in the DeGroot v. Beltman suit are numerous. It is hard to understand 
how any result in the DeGroot v. Beltman action could lead to any claim that there be an offset in 
favor of DeGroot for the costs and attorneys fees that this Court should award in favor of Standley 
against DeGroot in the DeGroot v. Standl~ action. 
Finally, set off or offset law has not been developed in Idaho. There has been development 
of some issues in federal court. For instance, in Goldman v. Burch, 780 F. Supp. 1441 (D. N.Y. 
1992), the Court held that a Defendant can be the prevailing party on a Counterclaim for the purpose 
of a cost award, even if Plaintiff has prevailed to a lesser degree on the case in chief. The case 
addresses who the prevailing party is and does not involve consolidation, but it is instructive on an 
award of attorneys fees and costs even if Plaintiff does prevail, which DeGroot does not. 
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jacobson, 37 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mo. 1965), the Court ruled that a 
judgment for costs awarded on appeal should not be set off against judgment on the merits for 
Plaintiff. This case is instructive on the fact that an award of costs that becomes a judgment is 
separate from the claims made by Plaintiff in their case in chief. Thus, a claim of offset is not sound 
basis for determining the prevailing party issue. 
Counterclaimant Standley believes that the Civil Rules and the cited cases firmly establish 
that fees and costs should be awarded against DeGroot, and the consolidation with another action 
is not relevant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Clearly, Counterclaimant Standley is the prevailing party and should be awarded attorneys 
fees. DeGroot chose to sue Standley and Houle, without also suing Beltman, and DeGroot chose to 
dispute the Counterclaim with no factual or legal defenses. This Court has ruled that Standley 
prevails on all of Standley's claims against DeGroot and all of DeGroot' s claims against Standley. 
The DeGroot v. Standley action is but one lawsuit and the issues before this Court on costs and 
attorneys fees should not be affected by the fact that DeGroot has now gone and filed a separate 
lawsuit in the DeGroot v. Beltman action. The two actions are completely separate. All costs and 
fees incurred by Standley pursuing the Counterclaim are related only to the DeGroot v. Standley 
action. The award of costs and attorneys fees should be made now, regardless of any claims pending 
in the DeGroot v. Beltman action. 
There is no legal or factual basis by which an award of costs and attorneys fees in favor of 
Standley can be offset if DeGroot prevails in the DeGroot v. Beltman action. DeGroot has no claim 
against Standley, but only against Beltman. 
Counterclaimant Standley respectfully requests this Court to award its attorneys fees. Such 
order should leave open all fees incurred by Counterclaimant Standley until this action is final. The 
claim for attorneys fees includes not only those fees sought in the Initial Memorandum, but also 
those fees sought through any Supplemental Memorandum of Costs that may be filed within the time 
constraints contemplated by Rule 54(d)(5). 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2005. 
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CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
~By: ~ Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Standley Trenching, 
Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of July, 2005, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
William A. McCurdy 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. Kelly 
Howard Lopez & Kelly PLLC 
702 W. Idaho, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701-0856 
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United States District Court S.D. New York. 
Lester M. MODICK et a!., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
James OS SOLA et aI., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
Joseph P. PHELAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
James P. PIERCE et a1., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
Matthew SEU et aI., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL CORPORATION et aI., Defendants. 
Paul S. GIBERMAN et aI., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et a1., 
Defendants. 
Joseph PAZDRO et aI., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CARVEL STORES OF NEW YORK, INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
Oct. 1, 1962. 
Motion to review taxation of costs in actions for 
fraud and for violation of antitrust laws where, in 
four of the actions, the plaintiffs had established 
antitrust violations. The District Court, Dawson, 1., 
held that, in actions in which neither fraud nor 
antitrust violations had been established, costs had 
been properly taxed against unsuccessful plaintiffs 
for docket fees, taking of depositions by defendants, 
and cost of transcripts of trial testimony, but that 
costs attributable to duplicate copies of defendants' 
depositions and trial transcripts should be deleted. 
Page 2 of7 
Page I 
Taxation of costs affirmed except to extent of 
referring matter to clerk for ascertainment of 
charges for additional copies so that such charges 
could be deleted from taxation of costs. 
See also 206 F.Supp. 636. 
West Headnotes 
[I) Federal Civil Procedure €=2727 
170Ak2727 Most Cited Cases 
Fact that certain of the plaintiffs in separate antitrust 
actions consolidated for trial successfully 
established anti-trust violations did not render all 
plaintiffs "prevailing parties" for purposes of 
taxation of costs. 
(2) Federal Civil Procedure €=2727 
170Ak2727 Most Cited Cases 
Where a plaintiff is not the prevailing party costs 
are properly assessed against him even though his 
action has been joined with that of another plaintiff 
and even though the actions were consolidated for 
trial. 
(3) Federal Civil Procedure €=2736 
170Ak2736 Most Cited Cases 
As part of taxation of costs docket fees were 
properly assessed for all nine fraud and antitrust 
cases which had been consolidated for trial where 
docket fees were in fact incurred in each of the 
separate actions and where actions had been 
consolidated only a relatively short time before trial. 
(4) Federal Civil Procedure €=2738 
170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases 
Cost of taking depositions is taxable in favor of 
prevailing party when the taking of the deposition 
was reasonably necessary even though deposition 
taken may not have been used at the trial. 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1920(2). 
(5) Federal Civil Procedure €=2738 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases 
Cost of depositions taken on behalf of prevailing 
defendants in fraud and antitrust actions would be 
taxed against plaintiffs notwithstanding their 
voluminous length and high cost where depositions 
merely represented results of defendants' full use of 
legitimate pre-trial procedures to ascertain exact 
nature of plaintiffs' charges. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920(2). 
[6] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2738 
170Ak2738 Most Cited Cases 
Cost of defendants' depositions taxed against 
unsuccessful plaintiffs in fraud and antitrust actions 
would be limited to the cost of a single original 
copy and would not include cost of duplicate copies 
obtained for convenience of counsel. 
[7] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740 
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases 
Cost of transcripts of trial testimony may be taxed 
against losing party when in court's judgment such 
transcripts are necessary for use in case. 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1920(2). 
[8] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740 
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases 
In fraud and antitrust trial lasting over six weeks 
and involving twelve different factual situations and 
interrelated claims necessitating availability of prior 
testimony to avoid time-wasting disagreements as to 
previous testimony, transcript was reasonably 
necessary for use in the case and its cost was 
properly taxed against losing plaintiffs. 28 
U.S.c.A. § 1920(2). 
[9] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740 
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases 
In action in which a trial transcript was necessary 
for use in the case, losing plaintiffs were properly 
taxed for its cost and cost of one copy for use of 
defense counsel, but plaintiffs could not properly be 
taxed for cost of additional copies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1920(2). 
[10] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740 
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases 
Cost of transcripts of pre-trial conferences is 
taxable when such transcripts are necessary for use 
in the case. 
[11] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2740 
170Ak2740 Most Cited Cases 
Page 3 of7 
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Cost of transcripts of pre-trial conferences devoted 
to limiting and clarifying issues and fonnulating 
plan of trial procedures in fraud and antitrust 
actions was properly taxed to unsuccessful plaintiffs 
as part of taxation of costs. 
[12] Federal Civil Procedure €;::::>2741 
170Ak2741 Most Cited Cases 
Witness fees are properly includable as costs of trial 
even where witness is friendly and appears 
voluntarily and is an officer of a corporate 
defendant. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920(3). 
[13] Witnesses €;::::>24 
410k24 Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses who are real parties in interest are not 
entitled to reimbursement or allowance for their 
testimony. 
(14) Witnesses €;::::>25 
410k25 Most Cited Cases 
Where actions were consolidated for trial witness 
fees were properly allowed real parties in interest 
where they testified in actions in which they were 
not party defendants. 
*362 Greenfield, Rothstein, Klein & Yarnell, New 
York City, for plaintiffs, Sidney W. Rothstein, Jules 
Yarnell, New York City, of counsel. 
Amen, Weisman & Butler, New York City, for 
'Carvel' defendants, Herbert F. Roth, Astoria, N.Y., 
of counsel. 
DA WSON, District Judge. 
This is a motion to review taxation of costs in the 
above actions. The costs have been taxed by the 
Clerk only in those cases in which a final judgment 
was directed to be entered on behalf of the 
defendants. There are four actions which still await 
trial on the issue of damages. In those cases no 
costs have been taxed. There were originally nine 
lawsuits, in which there were a total of twelve sets 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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of plaintiffs. Each lawsuit alleged a cause of action 
based on fraud and also a cause of action based on 
violations of the antitrust laws. 
In accordance with a pre-trial order entered on 
September 22, 1961 all of the actions for fraud were 
consolidated for trial pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. A trial was 
had and findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were filed on February 7, 1962. Thereafter the 
causes of action based on alleged violations of the 
antitrust laws went to trial. These also were 
consolidated for trial. Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the antitrust causes of action 
were filed on June 7, 1962. All of the actions for 
fraud were dismissed for failure of proof. All of the 
actions for alleged violations of the antitrust *363 
laws, with the exception of four, were dismissed. In 
those four cases the Court decided that the plaintiffs 
had established violations of the antitrust laws and 
directed that a hearing be held on the issue of 
damages. This hearing on the issue of damages has 
not yet been had and no costs are sought in those 
cases at the present time. 
Since the causes of action of the various plaintiffs 
were different causes of action involving different 
sets of facts it became necessary to determine 
separately the facts as to each set of plaintiffs, both 
on the fraud causes of action and on the antitrust 
causes of action, and findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw were handed down separately. 
There were a total of sixteen defendants in the 
fraud causes of action and a total of twenty-three 
defendants in the antitrust causes of action. It 
appears from the motion papers submitted by 
plaintiffs' attorneys that plaintiffs are challenging 
only the taxation of costs secured by the so-called 
'Carvel' defendants and not by the supplier 
defendants. 
1. The Prevailing Parties 
[I] The first contention of the plaintiffs on this 
motion for retaxation of costs is that plaintiffs are 
the prevailing parties and therefore not liable for 
costs. They assert that since the actions were 
Page 4 of7 
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consolidated for trial and four of the plaintiffs won 
on the actions for violations of the antitrust laws all 
plaintiffs should be deemed to be prevailing parties 
and therefore not liable for costs. This, of course, is 
erroneous. The fact that the actions were 
consolidated for trial does not mean that they were 
any less separate cases. Such consolidation was for 
the convenience of parties and the Court. There 
were the same number of cases tried in both the 
fraud and antitrust aspects and each case must stand 
on its own feet so far as costs are concerned. The 
consolidation of separate causes of action involving 
separate plaintiffs for trial purposes does not free a 
losing plaintiff from the duty of paying costs simply 
because another one of the plaintiffs was successful. 
'Where two causes of action, each by a different 
plaintiff and each against the same defendant, are 
consolidated for trial, and but one plaintiff is 
successful, the successful plaintiff is entitled to 
costs, and defendant is entitled to costs against the 
unsuccessful plaintiff. * * *, 20 C.l.S. Costs § 95, p. 
346; Cornell v. Gulf Oil Corp., 35 F.Supp. 448 
(E.D.Pa.1940). 
In the Pierce action there were four plaintiffs, each 
alleging separate causes of action sounding in fraud 
and violation of the antitrust laws. Here again 
certain plaintiffs won and certain plaintiffs lost, 
depending upon the facts of the case. The Court, so 
far as allowance of costs is concerned, will have to 
treat each plaintiff separately; those who lost will 
have to pay costs and those who won will be treated 
as prevailing parties. The mere fact that plaintiffs 
joined their causes of action in one suit does not 
change this rule. Since the four sets of plaintiffs 
joined in this action did not complain of damages 
arising out of a single transaction or occurrence, 
and since the evidence and proof at trial involved 
four separate claims, with four separate factual 
situations, each plaintiff will be treated separately in 
determining the prevailing party entitled to costs. 
[2] Where a plaintiff was the prevailing party no 
costs have been assessed against him. Where 
plaintiff was not the prevailing party costs were 
properly assessed against him, even though his 
action had been joined with that of another plaintiff 
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and even though the action was consolidated for 
trial. 
2. Docket Fees 
[3] Plaintiffs urge, in the second place, that there 
should be only a single docket fee in all nine cases 
since there was a consolidation for trial. This 
overlooks the fact that docket fees were incurred in 
each of the actions and that the *364 actions were 
consolidated only a relatively short time before 
trial. A docket fee in each case was properly 
assessed. 
3. Costs for Depositions 
Plaintiffs also complain about the allowance of 
costs for depositions. 
[4] It is well established that the cost of taking 
deposition is taxable in favor of the prevailing party 
when 'the taking of the deposition was reasonably 
necessary even though it may not have been used at 
the trial.' 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 1207. Title 
28 U.S.c. § 1920(2) sets forth clearly that the 
standard for taxing deposition costs is the necessity 
for use in the case. This language was changed from 
on the trial to indicate that discovery expenses, as 
well as trial expenses, can be recovered by the 
prevailing party if reasonably necessary. See 
Perlman v. Feldmann, 116 F.Supp. 102 (D.C.Conn. 
1953). 
[5] It is true that there were voluminous depositions 
taken on behalf of the defendants in each of the 
cases. Yet the severity of the charges promulgated 
by the plaintiffs, as well as the complexity of the 
legal and factual issues in each case, justified such 
lengthy and costly examination. The charge of fraud 
requires very precise proof and it is understandable 
that defendants went into great detail during the 
depositions to ascertain the exact nature of 
plaintiffs' charges. It should be borne in mind that 
plaintiffs themselves initiated the actions; they 
cannot now be heard to complain that defendants 
made full use of legitimate pre-trial procedures. 
[6] Plaintiffs argue that even if the costs of 
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depositions are to be taxed to them, their liability 
should be limited to the cost of a single original 
copy and not include the cost of duplicate copies 
obtained from the convenience of counsel. In this 
contention they are correct. Perlman v. Feldmann, 
D.C., 116 F.Supp. 102 (D.C.Conn.1953); Hope 
Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 104 
F.Supp. 444 (W.D.Mich.1954); General Casualty 
Co. of America v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58 
(D.C.Mont.1959). 
It is not clear from the papers on the taxation of 
costs whether any portion of the costs taxed for 
depositions covers duplicate copies obtained for the 
convenience of counsel. If it does, so much of such 
costs as are attributable to duplicate copies should 
be deleted. For this purpose the matter is remanded 
to the Clerk for consideration of the facts. 
4. Trial Transcripts 
Plaintiffs also object to the costs of trial transcripts. 
[7][8] The cost of transcripts of the trial testimony 
may be taxed against the losing party when in the 
Court's judgment such transcripts are necessary for 
use in the case. Title 28 V.S.c. § 1920(2) 
specifically authorizes the taxation of such costs, 
stating that the judge or clerk may tax as costs 'fees 
of the court reporters for all or any part of the 
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use 
in the case.' The determinative consideration, 
therefore, is whether the transcript was reasonably 
necessary for 'use in the case.' Bank of America v. 
Loew's International Corp., 163 F.Supp. 924 
(S.D.N.Y.1958); Manley v. Canterbury Corp., 17 
F.R.D. 234 (D.C.DeI.1955). In the instant case 
testimony at the fraud trial lasted for over six weeks 
and involved twelve different factual situations. 
Moreover, since all the claims were interrelated to 
some degree, it was necessary to have available the 
testimony of prior witnesses in order to minimize 
time-wasting disagreements as to what each witness 
actually testified. Because of the anticipated length 
and complexity of the trial, and since findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were required to be 
rendered at its conclusion, the Court, at a pre-trial 
conference, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), 
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ordered that a transcript be made and the cost 
included as part of the taxable costs of the case. 
The multiplicity of the allegations and the length of 
the testimony adduced at tria! served to reinforce 
the Court's opinion that copies of the transcript for 
both the Court and the parties *365 was a necessity, 
not merely a convenience. 
[9] The Court concludes that the taxation of costs 
for the trial transcript and for one copy obtained by 
defendants for the use of counsel is proper. If 
plaintiffs were charged for additional copies such 
additional expenses are not properly taxable as 
costs and the matter is remanded to the Clerk for 
determination of that fact. 
5. Pre-Trial Transcripts 
Plaintiffs next object to the taxation of costs of 
transcripts of pre-trial conferences. 
[10][11] The cost of transcripts of pre-trial 
conferences is taxable when such transcripts are 
necessary for use in the case. In cases of this type 
where the issues are varied and complicated, 
pre-trial conferences play an important role in 
narrowing and delineating the issues to be tried, 
ascertaining the order of proof and generally laying 
the groundwork for the trial itself. In the Bank of 
America case, supra, this Court held: 
'It is clear that the cost of the transcript of the 
minutes of the pre-trial proceedings may be allowed 
as a cost of the case, and particularly is this true 
where the pre-trial proceedings devoted 
considerable efforts to the limiting and clarifying of 
issues, were conducted at considerable length and 
where a proper understanding of the matters 
covered and preparation of a pre-trial order could 
not properly be had without a transcript thereof.' 
163 F.Supp. 924, 931-932. 
Pre-trial orders were often made a part of the 
conference transcript, and in any case, a careful 
reading of the transcript would have done much to 
clarify the issues remaining for trial. Defendants 
obtained and paid for a total of fifteen pre-trial 
conference transcripts. Only seven are requested to 
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be taxed as costs against the plaintiffs. Defendants 
assert that they chose these seven conferences 
because they were devoted to limiting and clarifying 
the issues and formulating a plan of trial 
procedures. The remaining eight conferences were 
not relevant in this regard and no attempt to tax 
them is made. 
In this case the Court feels it must exercise its 
discretion to tax the costs of pre-trial conference 
transcripts since they played a vital part in the 
progress of the lawsuit. 
6. Witness Fees 
The final item objected to in the taxation of costs 
was the allowance of certain witness fees. 
[12] Witness fees are properly includable as costs 
of trial, pursuant to 28 U .S.c. § 1920(3). This is 
true even where the witness is friendly and appears 
voluntarily and is an officer of a corporate 
defendant. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research 
Lab., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956); Perlman v. 
Feldmann, 116 F.Supp. 102; Bennett Chemical Co. 
v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.RD. 200 
(D.C.N.Y.1959). In the case at bar several witness 
fees were allowed for officers and employees of the 
Carvel defendants. As indicated above, there is no 
proscription against awarding costs for this reason. 
[13][14] Plaintiffs object on the additional ground 
that some witnesses for whom witness fees were 
awarded were not merely officers or employees of 
the defendant Carvel Corporation, but were 
individually named and served as defendants. It is 
true that witnesses who are real parties in interest 
are not entitled to reimbursement or allowance for 
their testimony. 6 Moore, Federal Practice § 
54.77(5); Ryan v. Arabian American Oil Company, 
18 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N. Y.1955). It appears that 
there are five individuals on whose behalf witness 
fees are requested who are also defendants in 
certain actions. (Pierce, Giberman and Pazdro). 
However, the record also indicates that three of 
these five testified only in actions in which they are 
not party defendants and the prohibitions against 
granting witness fees as to these three would not be 
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applicable. *366 The objection to witness fees 
granted by the Clerk should be overruled. 
Except to the extent that the matter is referred to 
the Clerk for the ascertainment of facts as outlined 
in the foregoing memorandum, the taxation of costs 
made by the Clerk is affirmed. When the Clerk has 
ascertained the facts as to the matters referred to 
him, further taxation of costs should be made on 
those items. 
209 F.Supp. 361, 6 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1025 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Motions, Pleadings and Filings 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Jane H. GOLDMAN and Allan Howard Goldman, 
as Executors Under the Last Will and 
Testament of Sol Goldman, Deceased, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Robert BURCH, Individually and as Trustee Under 
Trust Known as GC-J Trust, 
Defendant. 
No. 87 Civ. 7189 (BN). 
Jan. 13,1992. 
Executors of estate of hotel purchaser sought to 
recover amount allegedly overpaid for hotel. The 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 778 F.Supp. 781 entered 
judgment in part for sellers and in part for 
purchasers. Parties cross moved for relief. The 
District Court, Newman, Senior Judge, sitting by 
designation, held that: (I) purchasers were liable to 
sellers for accounts receivable which existed on 
date of closing; (2) hotel's cash receipts during 
seller management period, whether or not derived 
from accounts receivable, were available to seller to 
pay hotel's biIls; and (3) sellers were entitled to 
award of counsel fees as sellers were successful on 
their counterclaims to substantially greater extent 
than purchasers. 
Ordered accordingly. 
West Headnotes 
[1) Vendor and Purchaser €::=79 
400k79 Most Cited Cases 
Under amendment to hotel purchase agreement, 
purchaser was obligated to reimburse vendor for 
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uncollected balance of hotel's accounts receivable 
that existed as of first closing date and not as of 
management transfer date. 
[2] Vendor and Purchaser €::=196 
400k 196 Most Cited Cases 
Under amendment to hotel purchase agreement, 
only those accounts receivable relating to period 
after closing date which were on hand at closing 
belonged to purchaser and thus seller had right to 
use cash receipts during seller management period 
for hotel operation regardless of what percentage of 
hotel's revenues were derived from credit card sales; 
after receipt of funds for credit card sales during 
seller management period, accounts receivable 
became "cash receipts" and thus were not accounts 
receivable "on hand at closing." 
[3J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196 
400k196 Most Cited Cases 
Under hotel purchase agreement, cash payments 
received by hotel from account receivable debtors 
during seller management period could be used by 
seller to pay its bills received in normal course of 
business, including bills resulting from preseller 
management period expenses. 
[4J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196 
400k196 Most Cited Cases 
Hotel's cash receipts received during seller 
management period, whether or not derived initially 
from accounts receivable, were available to seller 
for payment of old bills received in ordinary course 
of business, for expenses accruing either before or 
after closing date; all cash receipts and 
disbursements during that period were factors in 
computing net profits in accordance with agreement 
and generally accepted principles of cash basis 
accounting. 
[5J Vendor and Purchaser €::=196 
400k196 Most Cited Cases 
Under hotel purchase agreement, "net profits" 
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included all expenses which hotel paid during seller 
management period whether those expenses accrued 
prior to or during that period. 
[6] Vendor and Purchaser €:=341(3) 
400k341(3) Most Cited Cases 
Corroborated testimony of trustee of seller 
supported finding that seller had made working 
capital advance to hotel purchaser, although 
unexplained failure of trustee to produce 
documentary evidence from hotel's bank 
establishing wire transfer bore on weight and 
credibility of testimony and other evidence; trustee's 
testimony and that of hotel's assistant controller 
showed that advance was transferred by wire to 
bank, for purposes of determining extent of amounts 
owed to purchaser for alleged overpayment. 
[7] Vendor and Purchaser €:=202 
400k202 Most Cited Cases 
Hotel purchase agreement showed that vendor and 
purchaser agreed explicitly and unconditionally on 
prorations and adjustments and thus vendor was 
entitled to receive apportionment credits in 
conformity with section of agreement covering 
prorations and adjustments of expenses that were 
paid by seller during seller management period. 
[8] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2737.5 
170Ak2737.5 Most Cited Cases 
Seller of hotel was entitled to award of reasonable 
counsel fees in action stemming from sale of hotel; 
seller was successful under its counterclaims to 
substantially greater extent than were purchasers on 
their complaint. 
[9] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2737.5 
170Ak2737.5 Most Cited Cases 
Trustee of seller of hotel was not entitled to award 
of counsel fees as "prevailing party" in his 
individual capacity in action stemming from sale, 
although seller was prevailing party, as trustee was 
not party to purchase agreement which was 
contractual predicate for fee shifting award of 
counsel fees, even though suit against trustee 
individually was frivolous. 
[10] Vendor and Purchaser €:=31 
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400k31 Most Cited Cases 
Error in hotel purchase agreement in making 
reference to local law governing fire protection 
systems for buildings other than hotels did not 
release seller from its obligation to reimburse 
purchasers for installing required fire protection 
system. 
[11] Federal Civil Procedure €:=2658 
170Ak2658 Most Cited Cases 
Cross motion made within ten business 
entry of judgment was timely. 
Civ.Proc.Rules 6(a, b), 52(b), 28 U .S.C.A. 
*1442 Stephen H. Penn & Associates, 
Hauser, New York City, for plaintiffs. 
days after 
Fed.Rules 
Noel W. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Mitchell A. Karlan, 
New York City, for defendant. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
NEWMAN, Senior Judge, United States Court of 
International Trade, sitting as a United States 
District Court Judge by Designation: 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties, asserting various errors in the court's 
Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated November 25, 1991, 778 F.Supp. 781 (1991), 
and the judgment entered thereon dated November 
29, 1991, have cross-moved for relief under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b), 59(a) and (e). Additionally, 
plaintiffs seek a new trial to adduce additional 
evidence regarding the Trust's claim of a $500,000 
cash advance to the Hotel by wire transfer for 
working capital. 
For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' applications 
are denied in toto; defendant's applications are 
granted in part. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in holding: 
"the plaintiff [sic] is [sic] absolutely obligated to 
pay the defendant an amount equal to the total of 
accounts receivable in favor of the Hotel as of the 
Management Transfer Date, September 30, 1987." 
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Affirmation of Noel W Hauser, dated December 5, 
1991, par. 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs further 
argue that the accounts receivable in question for 
which the court determined plaintiffs had an 
obligation to reimburse the Trust relate only to the 
period after May IS, 1987, which accounts 
according to plaintiff belonged to Goldman under § 
7(a) of the Amendment. *1443 Finally, plaintiffs 
claim that the court's award to defendant of 
$50,774.86 for accounts receivable is unsupported 
by the record. Accordingly, plaintiffs request that 
the court subtract $50,774.86 from the sum awarded 
to the Trust. The request is denied. 
[I] Counsel for plaintiffs has misread the court's 
opinion. The court did not hold that plaintiffs are 
liable to the Trust for accounts receivable as of the 
Management Transfer Date, September 30, 1987. 
Rather, the court determined that pursuant to § 7(a) 
of the Amendment, after the Management Transfer 
Date (viz., September 30, 1987) Goldman was 
obligated to reimburse the Trust $50,774.86 for the 
uncollected balance of accounts receivable that 
existed as of the First Closing, May 15, 1987. 
Plaintiffs concede that after the Management 
Transfer Date the Trust was entitled to the 
uncollected balance of accounts receivable existing 
as of the First Closing--May 15, 1987. 
Burch's credible and uncontradicted testimony 
(Burch, Tr. 106) and the figures shown in plaintiffs' 
exhibits 5 and 6 (based on the books and records of 
the Hotel) establish that the accounts receivable as 
of the First Closing (May IS, 1987) amounted to 
$850,623.55 and that by the Management Transfer 
Date (September 30, 1987) the Trust had withdrawn 
$799,848.69 from the Hotel during the Seller 
Management Period, leaving a balance due the 
Trust for uncollected accounts receivable of 
$50,774.86. Consequently, the court adheres to its 
prior award to the Trust of the balance of accounts 
receivable that existed as of May IS, 1987, to which 
the Trust was entitled under § 7. 
II. 
Plaintiffs persist in their challenge to the Trust's 
right pursuant to the Amendment to use revenues 
generated by the Hotel during the Seller 
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Management Period to pay bills received during 
such period for expenses incurred prior to that 
period. In further support of their position, 
plaintiffs have annexed an affidavit dated December 
5, 1991 executed by Paul Underhill, Goldman's 
representative at the Hotel during the Seller 
Management Period. Ostensibly, the affidavit calls 
to the court's attention controlling new facts. 
[2] According to Underhill's affidavit, a substantial 
percentage of the Hotel's sales of food, lodging, and 
other services were credit card transactions and 
other accounts receivable rather than cash receipts. 
Plaintiffs maintain that since under § 7(a) accounts 
receivable generated by the Trust after the First 
Closing for sales during the Seller Management 
Period belonged to Goldman, Burch had no right to 
pay pre-Seller Management Period expenses out of 
Hotel revenues, thus reducing "Net Profits" as 
defined in § 2. 
[3] Plaintiffs' argument ignores the fact that under § 
7(a), only those accounts receivable relating to the 
period after May 15, 1987 "which are on hand at 
closing" (emphasis added) belonged to Goldman 
(Burch, Tr. 93-4). That stipulation is clearly 
indicative of the Trust's right to use cash receipts 
during the Seller Management Period for Hotel 
operations. Regardless of what percentage of the 
Hotel's revenues were derived from credit card sales 
and thus were initially on the Hotel's books as 
accounts receivable, after receipt of funds from the 
banks for credit card sales during the Seller 
Management Period, the accounts receivable 
became "cash receipts" and obviously were not 
accounts receivable "on hand at closing." After 
receipt by the Hotel of cash payments from the 
accounts receivable debtors during the Seller 
Management Period, such cash receipts were 
properly used by the Trust for payment of its bills 
received in the normal course of business during the 
Seller Management Period, including bills resulting 
fi'om pre-seller Management Period expenses. 
Such cash disbursements reduced Seller 
Management Period "Net Profits" in accordance 
with § 2 of the Amendment and with principles of 
cash basis accounting. 
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[4] Thus, even accepting the facts recited in the 
Underhill affidavit, the court adheres to its previous 
ruling that the Hotel's *1444 "cash receipts" during 
the Seller Management Period (whether or not 
derived initially from accounts receivable) were 
available to the Trust for payment of all bills 
received in the ordinary course of business, whether 
for expenses accruing before or on and after May 
16, 1987. All cash receipts and disbursements 
during the Seller Management Period were factors 
in the computation of "Net Profits" in accordance 
with the definition thereof in § 2 and in accordance 
with generally accepted principles of cash basis 
accounting. Conversely, under § 7(a), any Seller 
Management Period accounts receivable still on 
hand at closing (viz., uncollected receivables) 
belonged to Goldman, and since accounts 
receivable were neither cash receipts nor cash 
disbursements, they were not relevant to the 
calculation of "Net Profits" under § 2 or under cash 
basis accounting principles. 
As was stressed in the original opmIOn, a critical 
issue in the determination of the "net profits" of a 
business within a certain time-frame is the method 
of accounting agreed upon by the parties. 
Inexplicably, in the case of the Amendment, which 
obviously received close scrutiny by counsel for 
Burch and Goldman, there is no definitive 
agreement regarding the accounting method for the 
determination of "Net Profits." 
[5] Arguably, the "bare bones" definition of "Net 
Profits" in § 2 of the Amendment--in essence, cash 
receipts less cash disbursements--strongly suggests 
that cash basis accounting was intended by the 
parties to the Amendment, but the definition is not 
explicit in that regard. On the basis that the 
definition of "Net Profits" in the Amendment was 
ambiguous, plaintiffs sought, successfully, rulings, 
initially from Judge Cedarbaum and after 
reassignment of this case, from the writer, avoiding 
the strictures of the Parol Evidence Rule. Thus, at 
trial, the parties were permitted to establish the 
intent of Goldman (who was deceased at the time of 
trial) and Burch by the context in which the term 
was used, the situation of the parties and the 
surrounding circumstances pertaining to the 
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Amendment. 
As pointed up in the original opmlOn concerning 
accounting methodology, counsel for plaintiffs 
questioned his witness Breger at trial specifically 
concerning the method of accounting he had 
discussed with Burch--cash basis or accrual 
basis--and attorney Breger (who negotiated and 
reviewed the Amendment on behalf of Goldman) 
testified unequivocally on direct examination that 
the method he discussed was "on a cash basis" 
(Breger, Tr. 43). 
Plaintiffs now disingenuously attempt, in a 
back-handed fashion, to impeach the testimony of 
Breger, a veteran business lawyer, on his 
understanding of the distinction between cash basis 
and accrual accounting. Plaintiffs have not even 
submitted an affidavit by Breger supporting their 
bald allegation that his understanding of cash basis 
accounting differed from the fundamental 
accounting sense. 
There is no suggestion in the record that in 
determining the "net profits" of a Hotel, the terms 
"cash basis" and "accrual basis" accounting have a 
special meaning in the Uniform System of Hotel 
Accounting that differs from generally accepted 
accounting principles. Moreover, the 
authoritativeness of the "Uniform System" as an 
accounting "bible" for the hotel industry is largely 
emasculated by the fact that "nobody completely 
abides by it" (Coords, Tr. 232). 
III. 
[6] Plaintiffs contend that the court's finding of a 
$500,000 working capital advance by the Trust is 
"not supported by anything of record" and therefore 
is "clearly erroneous" (plfts' motion, par. 18). Such 
contention is frivolous since it ignores the 
uncontradicted and credible testimony of Burch 
corroborated by that of Leyco, the Hotel's assistant 
controller, showing the advance was transferred by 
wire to the Hotel's bank, Manufacturers Hanover. 
[FN1] *1445 See Burch, Tr. 104-107, 156, 162; 
Leyco, Tr. 13, 53-55, 67, 69-70; Coords, Tr. 202, 
204, 217-18, 236, 243-44; plfts' exh. 5 ("Working 
Capital") and 6 ($150,000 "net advances by seller"), 
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24,25; and deft's exh. 5. 
FNI. Plaintiffs' own witness, Leyco, 
testified: 
Q. [YJou know, do you not, from our own 
personal knowledge that Mr Burch during 
September, 1987 did in fact contribute 
$500,000 working capital to the Hotel 
Dorset business, correct? 
A. $500,000 was bank wired sometime III 
September 1987, yes. Leyco, Tr. 69. 
The Amendment contemplated that Burch could 
make a working capital advance if Goldman failed 
to do so and that such advance by the Trust would 
be reimbursed with interest (deft's exh. B, § 7( d); 
Burch, Tr. 63-64, 95. Understandably, if the 
advance was transferred by wire directly to the 
Hotel's bank, the advance might not appear in the 
Hotel's cash schedule or other records of cash 
receipts, including cash received shown on the daily 
reports. Of course, defendant's unexplained failure 
to produce documentary evidence from the Hotel's 
bank establishing the wire transfer bears on the 
weight and credibility of the testimonial and other 
evidence submitted by defendant. Nonetheless, the 
court concludes that on the issue of the working 
capital advance by the Trust, Burch's corroborated 
testimony was sufficient to make a finding in favor 
of the Trust. Reopening the case for additional 
evidence on the working capital issue, as requested 
by plaintiffs, is entirely unwarranted. 
IV. 
[7] In the original opinion, 778 F.Supp. at 789, the 
court determined that when the Agreement 
providing for the prorations was executed, the 
parties did not contemplate a Seller Management 
Period or reduction in purchase price by "Net 
Profits," as thereafter provided for in § 2 of the 
Amendment. Hence, the court concluded that 
under the Amendment, the parties did not intend 
that the Trust should receive both apportionment 
credits in conformity with § 5.01 of the Agreement 
and a reduction of "Net Profits" for expenses paid 
out of Hotel revenues during the Seller 
Management Period under § 2. 
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Defendant now urges, and the court is constrained 
to agree, that the parties had precisely 
apportionment of the § 5.0 I expenses in mind when 
they reiterated in §§ 5(e) and 6(d) of the 
Amendment that there be prorations as provided in § 
5.01--ostensibly following the parties' 
understanding that during the SeIler Management 
Period, the Hotel and its revenues still belonged to 
the Trust, not Goldman. Accordingly, the Trust 
maintains that it should recover the sum of 
$254,632.31 for the § 5.0 I prorations and 
adjustment of expenses that were paid by the Trust 
out of Seller Management Period revenues and 
benefitted Goldman after September 30, 1987. 
In the Amendment, Burch and Goldman agreed 
explicitly, unqualifiedly and unconditionally on 
prorations and adjustments under § 5.01, without 
excepting expenses paid by the Trust out of Hotel 
revenues during the Seller Management Period. "A 
court may not rewrite into a contract conditions the 
parties did not insert or, under the guise of 
interpretation, add or excise terms ... " Marine 
Associates v. New Suffolk Development CO/p., 125 
A.D.2d 649,510 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (2d Dept.J986) 
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court 
modifies its fonner determination regarding the 
prorations under § 5.01 and now, awards the Trust 
an additional $254,632.3 I to be added to the net 
amount of the judgment previously awarded to the 
Trust on its counteriaims--$70,787.92 plus 
prejudgment interest. 
V. 
[8] Defendant asserts that the court erroneously 
denied it an award of its counsel fees in accordance 
with § 14(e) the Agreement as the "prevailing 
party," citing Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 
1058 (10th Cir.1990); StudiengesellschaJt Kohle v. 
Eastman Kodak, 713 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir.1983); 
Solow v. Wellner, 150 Misc.2d 642, 569 N.Y.S.2d 
882, 888 (Civ.Ct.1991). See also 10 Wright, 
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
2667, p. 191 (1983) ("a successful counterclaimant 
generally will be considered the prevailing party 
when plaintiff fails to recover or is awarded less 
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than defendant receives on *1446 the 
counterclaim"). On reconsideration of defendant's 
request for counsel fees, the court concludes on the 
basis of the authorities called to its attention that 
since defendant has overwhelmingly succeeded 
under its counterclaims and to a substantially 
greater extent than did plaintiffs on their complaint, 
the Trust is entitled to be awarded its reasonable 
counsel fees. 
VI. 
[9] Defendant Burch in his individual capacity also 
requests an award of attorney's fees inasmuch as his 
motion for summary judgment of dismissal was 
granted by Judge Cedarbaum. Although Judge 
Cedarbaum found that there was no justification for 
suing Burch individually and such suit was 
frivolous (March 23, 1990 transcript, p. 21-22), 
unfortunately Burch's request (in his individual 
capacity) for counsel fees as the "prevailing party" 
must be denied. Burch in his individual capacity 
although a party to this lawsuit was not a party to 
the Agreement, which is a contractual predicate for 
a fee-shifting award of counsel fees to the 
"prevailing party." However, since an award of 
costs to the prevailing party is provided by 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), Burch is awarded costs in both 
his individual capacity and capacity as Trustee. 
VII. 
[10] The court does not concur with defendant's 
argument, previously addressed in the original 
opinion, that because § 17 of the Agreement refers 
to Local Law 5, the Trust was not obligated to 
reimburse Goldman for installing a fire system in 
compliance with Local Law 16. It was previously 
mentioned that Local Law 5 applies to buildings 
other than Hotels. The court may readily infer 
from the context of the provision that both parties 
intended the inept reference to "the balance of 
Local Law 5" (Agreement, § 17, emphasis added) 
as merely a short-hand description for additional 
fire alarm system work in the Hotel reqUired by the 
New York City fire code. 
Since Local Law 5 applies to fire protection 
systems, but in buildings other than hotels, 
defendant's literal reading of the contract to refer to 
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reimbursement to Goldman for only work under 
Local Law 5 simply ignores the substance of their 
agreement and attempts to take advantage of an 
error in citing the applicable Local Law. 
Defendant's argument results in ascribing to the 
parties an intent to provide a meaningless and 
ineffectual-- indeed absurd-- agreement regarding 
reimbursement to Goldman for fire alarm system 
work. Fundamentally, a literal reading of contract 
language should be eschewed by the court where 
such interpretation makes the provision in question 
absurd or meaningless, and the substance of parties' 
agreement may be gleaned and effectuated 
consistently with their obvious intent. 
Accordingly, the court adheres to original findings 
and conclusions. 
VlII. 
[11] Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant's 
cross-motion, filed on December 13, 1991 is 
untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) since it was not 
made within the ten days after the entry of judgment 
permitted by the rule, and that the ten day period 
may not be extended by the court under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Defendant, however, has not 
requested an extension of time under Rule 6(b) and 
maintains, correctly, that its cross-motion filed on 
December 13, 1991 was made within ten business 
days after entry of judgment on November 29, 
1991, and is therefore timely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
6(a). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. The judgment entered on November 29, 1991 is 
hereby vacated and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as set forth in the opinion of 
November 25, 1991 are modified to the extent 
indicated supra. 
2. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order 
the Trust shall file in this court and serve plaintiffs 
with an application for an award of counsel fees 
with *1447 supporting documentation. Plaintiffs 
may respond to such application within twenty (20) 
days after service of the application; defendant may 
thereafter file and serve a reply within five (5) days 
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after service of plaintiffs' response. 
780 F.Supp. 1441 
Motions, Pleadings and Filings (Back to top) 
• 1:87 cv07189 (Docket) 
(Oct. 07, 1987) 
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United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, 
Western Division. 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Joseph P. JACOBSON, Defendant. 
No. 12345-1. 
June II, 1965. 
Surety's action to recover on indemnity agreement. 
The District Court, John W. Oliver, 1., held that 
defendants who were granted costs by Court of 
Appeals which had reversed action of District Court 
in granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
were entitled, on remand at which summary 
judgment was again entered for plaintiff to 
execution for amount of costs taxed rather than 
having amount of costs offset against monetary 
judgment awarded plaintiff in excess of costs. 
Judgment for plaintiff in accordance with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Federal Courts 0=>951.1 
170Bk951.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 170Bk951, 106k406.9(18)) 
Where defendant, on remand of case after district 
court's action in sustaining plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment had been reversed by Court of 
Appeals, elected to produce no further evidence and 
defense counsel after having been given opportunity 
to examine plaintiffs files after close of trial on 
remand stated he still did not have any defense, 
summary judgment was again entered for plaintiff. 
12] Courts 0=>96(4) 
106k96(4) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 106k96) 
District Court has duty to follow mandate of Court 
of Appeals. 
[31 Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2621 
170Ak2621 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2742.1 
170Ak2742.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 170Ak2742) 
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Entry of judgment and taxation of costs are entirely 
separate legal acts. 28 U .S.C.A. § 1920; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 58, 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct. 
of App. 8th Cir. rule 17, 28 U.S.C.A.; 
U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules W.D.Mo., rule 4. 
[4) Federal Civil Procedure 0=>2748 
170Ak2748 Most Cited Cases 
Defendants who had been granted costs by Court of 
Appeals, which had reversed action of district court 
in granting plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment, were entitled on remand, at which 
summary judgment was again entered for plaintiff, 
to execution for amount of costs taxed rather than 
having amount of costs offset against monetary 
judgment awarded plaintiff in excess of costs. 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1920; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 58, 28 
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct. of App. 8th Cir. rule 17, 28 
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules W.D.Mo., rule 4. 
*427 Rodger J. Walsh, Kansas City, Mo., for 
plaintiff. 
John M. Cleary, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant. 
JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge. 
Our earlier action sustaining plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals in Jacobson v. Maryland Casualty 
Company, 8th Cir. 1964, 336 F.2d 72, cert. denied 
379 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 655, 13 L.Ed.2d 558, for 
reasons there stated. 
The Court of Appeals held that the pre-trial 
procedures followed by this Court did 'not justify 
the trial court in refusing [defendant] his day in 
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court, particularly on the issue of his affinnative 
defense, as well as as any other issue not shown by 
the record to be a sham, frivolous or so 
unsubstantial that a trial would obviously be futile: 
In compliance with the portion of the mandate of 
the Court of Appeals remanding this case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion, we 
afforded the defendant the day in court that our 
controlling court held had been refused him. 
Defendant elected not to use that day any differently 
than he used the other days he has spent in our 
Court. The defendant did cross-examine the 
witnesses called by the plaintiff to re-establish its 
prima facie case on remand but *428 he called no 
witnesses of his own and introduced no evidence 
whatever. [FN 1] 
FN I. The transcript of the trial on remand 
shows the following question and answer 
directed by the Court to counsel for the 
defendant: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you if you have 
any evidence that you would wish to 
adduce in connection with the presentation 
of any alleged defenses in regard to Mr. 
Jacobson's case? The Court of Appeals 
indicated that they felt that Mr. Jacobson 
had been denied his day in this court, and I 
want to make certain that he has his day in 
this court, and that it appear of record that 
full opportunity has been given him, * * * 
Now, do you have any evidence at all to 
introduce here today? 
MR. CLEARY [counsel for the 
defendant]: I have no evidence to 
introduce today, Your Honor. 
During the course of the trial on remand we 
required that plaintiff made available to counsel for 
the defendant its entire office file of any and all 
matters connected with plaintiffs cause of action in 
order to afford defendant's counsel an additional 
'opportunity to examine them [all of plaintiffs office 
files] to see whether or not he can ferret out any 
affinnative defense from those records.' 
Defendant's counsel was given a two week period 
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after the close of the trial on remand within which 
to accomplish that task. Defendant's counsel 
reported to the Court at the end of that period that, 
he had made a full examination of all of plaintiffs 
records and that he stilI did not have any defense to 
plaintiffs cause of action and that he had found no 
evidence in plaintiffs files to support any alleged 
affinnative defense. 
[1] The judgment heretofore entered on plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment in accordance with 
our earlier pre-trial procedures will again be entered 
because we believe the procedures we have 
followed on remand have been consistent with the 
mandate of our controlling Court. 
A real dispute between the parties, however, has 
been created by that portion of the mandate of the 
Court of Appeals that taxed appellate costs against 
the plaintiff on the appeal. We tum now to that 
question. 
The last part of the Court of Appeals' mandate 
provided that: 
And it is further Ordered by this Court that 
Joseph P. Jacobson have and recover against 
Maryland Casualty Company the sum of Three 
Hundred, Seventy-six and 6211 OO--Dollars for its 
costs in this behalf expended and have execution 
therefor. 
Shortly before the date we set this case for the trial 
on remand, plaintiff filed a motion for a stay of 
proceedings to enforce the quoted portion of the 
Court of Appeals' mandate. Conferences between 
the Court and counsel for both parties had revealed 
(a) that defendant still did not have any known 
defense to plaintiffs cause of action; [FN2] and (b) 
that plaintiffs counsel was personally obligated to 
E. L. Mendenhall Brief Printing Company for the 
cost of printing the record on appeal. [FN3] 
FN2. As is apparent from footnote 2 of the 
Court of Appeals opinion, this was not the 
first time that defendant had advised this 
Court that there never has been any real 
dispute about the facts of this case and that 
the alleged affirmative defense as pleaded 
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by the defendant was only a 'paper' defense. 
FN3. That fact, and the further fact that 
defendant's counsel advised us in his most 
recent brief that defendant lives in Canada 
and that defendant's counsel 'has not been 
able to get him to respond to 
correspondence or telephone calls in his 
efforts to be paid for said record on appeal 
(or even for other expenses)' are facts 
totally without significance in regard to the 
determination of the question relating to 
costs that has arisen since the remand of 
this case from the Court of Appeals. 
As a result of those conferences, the parties agreed 
that each would write the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals to ascertain whether the $376.62 costs 
taxed by *429 the Court of Appeals should or 
should not be offset against the judgment that both 
parties acknowledged should again be entered for 
the plaintiff. 
Counsel for the defendant wrote the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals and requested that an execution be 
issued by that Court. In his letter, defendant's 
counsel stated that: 'It is apparent that in all 
probability the Maryland Casualty Company will 
obtain a judgment for more than the amount of the 
costs' and added that 'the request for an execution is 
made in order to determine whether such execution 
can be obtained before a final judgment in the case.' 
Counsel for the plaintiff stated in his letter that: 
The question involved in this matter is whether 
Maryland Casualty Company should pay Joseph 
P. Jacobson the sum of $376.62 under your 
court's mandate before the District Court enters a 
final judgment, after trial, against Jacobson for 
Maryland in excess of these costs, or whether the 
District Court can set off the sum of $376.62 
against the prospective judgment in Maryland's 
favor against Jacobson. 
I am of the opinion that the cost mandate of this 
Court can be used as a set-off in the judgment 
against Jacobson or it can be a partial satisfaction 
of the judgment. * * * 
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* * * 
I therefore respectfully request a stay of execution 
in this matter until the District Court enters a final 
judgment under Rule 54. 
The Clerk of the Court of Appeals replied to both 
letters as follows: 
These two letters have been distributed to the 
panel of judges before whom this appeal was 
submitted and I have been directed to write you 
as follows: The mandate of this Court in which 
we provided for taxation of costs in the District 
Court was in our usual form and in accord with 
our regular practice. This Court has no process to 
enforce execution as does the District Court and 
the Court declines to issue execution as requested 
by Mr. Cleary [counsel for the defendant]. 
The fact that the Court of Appeals refused 
defendant's request for execution and the fact that it 
also refused plaintiffs request for a stay of 
execution left the question for our determination. 
We requested authorities from both sides. 
Plaintiff now relies upon Rule 54(b) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, although he based his original 
motion for a stay on Rule 62 of those Rules. Neither 
of those Rules, in our judgment, touch the question. 
Nor were the cases cited by defendant, in our 
judgment, close to the point; they need not be 
discussed. 
Independent research, however, has convinced us 
that plaintiffs motion to stay execution should be 
denied and that the costs taxed by the Court of 
Appeals should be paid defendant in spite of the 
fact that plaintiff may never be able to collect a 
single cent of its judgment. [FN4] 
FN4. Plaintiff argues in its last brief that 
'it is unfortunate that defendant's counsel 
owes the printer but the Court of Appeals' 
mandate was not in favor of the 
defendant's counsel and in all equity the 
plaintiff should not have to expend more 
money for defendant's benefit than it has 
already.' Plaintiff added: That defendant's 
counsel cannot collect from his own client 
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for his fees and expenses augers a dim 
future for plaintiff in ever collecting on its 
own judgment.' Those arguments are as 
irrelevant as the argument made by the 
defendant that we noted in footnote 3. 
[2] The point of beginning is the recognition of the 
duty of this Court to follow the mandate of our 
Court of Appeals. The following language of Judge 
Sambom from Thornton v. Carter, 8th Cir. 1940, 
109 F.2d 316, 319, was *430 most recently quoted 
with approval in Paull v. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Company, 8th Cir. 1963,313 F.2d 612,617: 
'When a case has been decided by this court on 
appeal and remanded to the District Court, every 
question which was before this court and 
disposed of by its decree is finally settled and 
detennined. The District Court is bound by the 
decree and must carry it into execution according 
to the mandate. It cannot alter it, examine it 
except for purposes of execution, or give any 
further or other relief or review it for apparent 
error with respect to any question decided on 
appeal, and can only enter a judgment or decree 
in strict compliance with the opinion and 
mandate.' 
In dealing with questions relating to the entry of 
judgment and the taxation of costs, recognition must 
also be made of the fact that neither the applicable 
statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1920), the rules of various 
courts (Rule 17 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit and Local Rule 4 of this 
Court) nor the rules of decision announced in the 
few cases that discuss questions of taxation of costs 
are phrased with what Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of 
Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 287, 65 S.Ct. 1157, 89 
L.Ed. 1611 (1945), [FN5] called a 'fastidious 
precision' oflanguage. 
FN5. The paucity of reported cases that 
relate to the taxation of costs, both in the 
trial and the appellate courts is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that, except 
under unusual circumstances, the taxation 
of costs is not an appealable order. In 
order to afford plaintiff the opportunity to 
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appeal our ruling on the taxation of costs 
question we are including that ruling in our 
final judgment. 
[3] It is clear, however, that the Rules of Civil 
Procedure now expressly recognize that the entry of 
a judgment and the taxation of costs are entirely 
separate legal acts. The failure to make express 
recogmtlOn of that proposition prompted an 
amendment to Rule 58 in the year 1946 by the 
addition of a sentence in that rule that '[the] entry of 
the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of 
costs.' That added sentence in the 1946 amendment 
was carried over in its entirety when present Rule 58 
was amended in 1963. 
As the cases cited by the Advisory Committee on 
Rules in support of the 1946 amendment imply, and 
as the cases to which we shall call attention hold, 
courts that have been called upon to pass upon 
questions of costs have consistently recognized that 
questions relating to the taxation of costs, 
particularly to the taxation of costs by an appellate 
court, are not to be confused with questions that 
relate to the merits of an appeal or with questions 
that relate to the validity or invalidity of an actual 
judgment rendered by the trial court. 
For a collection of the cases that relate to 'the 
award of costs by appellate court as affected by 
subsequent proceedings or course of action in the 
lower court,' see the annotation under that title in 
116 A.L.R. 1152. 
The Federal cases are clear and consistent. The 
leading case in the federal courts was decided by 
Judge and later Justice Lurton. It is Scatcherd v. 
Love, 6 Cir. 1908, 166 F. 53. 
The first trial in that case resulted in a verdict for 
the defendant. The plaintiff was successful in the 
first appeal. Appellate costs were therefore taxed 
against defendant. After remand the case was 
settled and the trial court taxed the appellate costs, 
together with other costs, against the defendant. 
Judge Lurton held that the '[c]osts paid by plaintiff 
* * * in obtaining a review, are costs which the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover' (I. c. 56 of 166 F.). 
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He held that '[t]his is true * * * for the * * * reason 
that the costs of the fonner writ of error were 
adjudged by this court [i. e. the Court of Appeals] 
against the defendant * * * and the judgment was 
made the judgment of the *431 court below' (I. c. 57 
of 166 F.). That case emphasized that '[t]his 
judgment [for appellate costs made by the appellate 
court] was beyond the control of the court below, 
regardless of the final result of the case' (I. c. 57 of 
166 F.). 
The cases of Berthold v. Burton, S.D.N.Y.1909, 
169 F. 495, and Jennings v. Burton, S.D.N.Y.1910, 
177 F. 603, presented a situation not dissimilar from 
the present posture ofthis case. 
In that case plaintiffs recovered a judgment on the 
first trial. That judgment was reversed by the Court 
of Appeals and costs of appeal were taxed by the 
appellate court against the plaintiff. Those costs 
were then paid. Plaintiff, as plaintiff in this case, 
was also successful in the second trial but, in 
connection with the taxation of costs after the 
second trial, he sought to have allowed his payment 
of the appellate costs as a 'disbursement' and 
therefore included as a part of the costs taxed after 
the second trial the money he had paid for the costs 
taxed against him in the appellate court in 
connection with the successful appeal of the first 
trial. 
Plaintiffs request was denied because the court 
held that 'to allow reimbursement in the way 
suggested would practically be to annul its [the 
Court of Appeals] decision.' 
[4] Should we allow plaintiff in this case to offset 
the amount of appellate costs taxed against it by the 
Court of Appeals, we would, as a practical matter, 
prevent defendant from recovering the costs taxed 
by the Court of Appeals and would in effect annul 
that action taken by our controlling court. Cf. 
Parkerson v. Borst, 5th Cir. 1919,256 F. 827,828, 
and Miller v. C. C. Hartwell Co., 5th Cir. 1921, 271 
F. 385, 389-390. 
The two Burton cases cited above were followed in 
Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 2nd Cir. 1937, 93 
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F.2d 292, 293, and in Broffe v. Horton, 2nd Cir. 
1949, 173 F.2d 565. The Broffe case, in tum, was 
followed most recently in Steams v. Tinker & 
Rasor, 9th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 589, 606. 
We shall follow this line of cases. Final judgment 
will therefore be entered in favor of the plaintiff on 
the merits. That judgment will include a provision 
that will order execution in favor of defendant for 
the $376.62 costs taxed in defendant's favor by the 
Court of Appeals unless plaintiff voluntarily makes 
that payment within ten (10) days. 
37 F.R.D. 427 
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COUNTY 
P. SPIERING, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
BEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A-l 
Filing Fee: $77.00 
COME NOW, CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT DAIRY, LLC (hereinafter 
referred to as "Plaintiffs"), the above-named Plaintiffs, and for their claims for relief and causes 
of action against the Defendant, BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC. d/b/a BELTMAN 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
4 
WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION, a Washington corporation ("Beltman"), COMPLAIN 
AND ALLEGE as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Charles DeGroot at all times relevant herein was a resident of Canyon 
County, Idaho. 
2. Plaintiff DeGroot Dairy, LLC is an Idaho LLC \vith its principal place of business 
in Canyon County Idaho. 
3. Plaintiffs are "Buyers" within the meaning of Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-
103. 
4. Defendant Beltman is a Washington corporation doing business in Canyon 
County, Idaho. At the time the acts and omissions complained of herein occurred, Beltman was 
doing business as Beltman Welding and Construction. 
5. Defendant Beltman is a "Seller" within the meaning of Idaho Commercial Code § 
28-2-103. 
6. This court has jurisdiction over Beltman pursuant to Idaho Code § S-S14( a). 
7. Venue is proper in Canyon County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404 
because Defendant does not reside in Idaho and the causes of action complained of herein arose 
in Canyon County, Idaho. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Plaintiffs own and operate a 2,000+ head dairy in Canyon County, Idaho. 
9. In June 1999, Plaintiff Charles "Chuck" DeGroot entered into a contract with 
Beltman for the construction of a dairy facility near Melba, Canyon County, Idaho. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is a true and correct copy of said 
contract. 
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10. Pursuant to the contract, Defendant was to construct a dairy facility including the 
following: two (2) free stall sheds, including lockups (only one of which was to be built 
immediately); a dry shed, maternity and sick shed, including lockups; fences and gates; service 
alleys, loading chute and catch pens behind the barn; plumbing; asphalt area by the commodity 
shed and silage area; gravel driveways; a manure handling system; and heifer corrals, including 
lockups. 
11. The total cost of the dairy facility was set at $2,095,828.00 to be paid as follmvs: 
down payment of $50,000.00; six (6) monthly payments of $240,000.00 beginning July 10, 1999 
and ending on December 10, 1999; the balance of $665,828.00 to be paid in three (3) payments 
of $160,000.00 at the start of construction on the second free stall and heifer corrals (weather 
permitting); and $125,828 due upon completion. 
12. In about July or August 1999, Defendant subcontracted the engineering, design 
and installation of manure handling equipment to Standley Trenching, Inc. d/b/a Standley & Co. 
("Standley") for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. Standley is a distributor 
of manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle & Fils, Inc. ("Houle"). 
13. The equipment and products sold by Defendant to Plaintiffs are "goods" within 
the meal1lng of Idaho Commercial Code §§ 28-2-105 and/or 28-2-107. Said goods include 
without limitation "goods" manufactured by Houle. 
14. Defendant collected from Plaintiffs and in tum paid Standley in excess of 
$100,000 for engineering, designing and installing manure handling equipment (including Houle 
equipment) at Plaintiffs' dairy. 
15. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs relied upon Defendant's knowledge, 
representations, expertise and experience to design and construct a properly functioning dairy for 
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Plaintiffs. In connection with this, Plaintiffs relied on Defendant to hire subcontractors who 
would provide goods and services free of defects. 
16. The manure handling equipment installed at the Plaintiffs' dairy by Standley at 
the direction and request of Defendant is inadequate, does not function as intended, and is not fit 
for its intended use. 
17. Because of the defects and deficiencies in the manure handling system installed 
by Standley at the direction and request of Defendant, Plaintiffs v,·ere required to contract 
directly with Standley to modify and renovate the manure handling equipment. The amount 
charged for said "renovation" work exceeds $35,000. 
COUNT ONE 
Breach of Contract 
18. PlaintifIs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 above. 
19. In connection with the contract for Plaintiffs' purchase of their dairy facility, 
Defendant promised to constmct the dairy facility in a vvorkmanlike manner and to provide a 
dairy facility free of defects in constmction. 
20. Plaintiffs paid Defendant in excess of $2,000,000.00 for the construction of 
Plaintiffs' dairy facility. 
21. Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs by failing to construct the dairy in 
a workmanlike manner, resulting in numerous defects in the operation of the dairy, particularly 
with respect to the manure handling system installed by Standley at the direction and request of 
Defendant. 
22. Plaintiffs have been required to spend over $35,000 repairing, renovating and 
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modifying the defective/inadequate manure handling system installed by Standley, which 
amount is in excess of the total cost of the improperly functioning system. Despite Plaintiffs 
efforts to renovate and repair the system installed by Standley, the system still does not function 
properly and/or does not perform as contracted. 
23. Plaintiffs have suffered consequential damages as a direct and proximate result of 
Defendant's breach in an exact amount to be proven at trial. 
24. As a direct result of Defendant's breach of contract, Plaintiffs suffered damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000. 
25. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of the law firm of White 
Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNTT\VO 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
26. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 25 above. 
27. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant. 
28. The covenant requires Defendant to act in good faith, with fairness and with 
honesty-in-fact toward Plaintiffs. As a further result of the acts, omissions and occurrences 
alleged herein above, Defendant violated, nullified and/or significantly impaired the benefits 
provided to Plaintiffs under contractual relationship and thus materially breached its implied 
obligation to act in good faith, fairness and honesty-in-fact toward Plaintiffs. 
29. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, as alleged herein above, 
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Plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of lost profits, lost opportunity, and other special and 
general damages in an exact amount to be proven at trial in a sum in excess of $10,000. 
30. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of the law firm of \Vhite 
Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-12l. 
COUNT THREE 
Rescission 
31. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 30 above. 
32. Defendant constructed Plaintiffs' dairy facility during the fall of 1999 and winter 
of 2000. As part of Defendant's construction of the dairy facility, it hired subcontractors, 
including Standley, to design and install the various operating systems at the dairy. 
33. Substantially all of the manure handling equipment installed at Plaintiffs' dairy by 
Defendant was manufactured by Houle. 
34. The design and equipment supplied and installed by Standley and manufactured 
by Houle at the direction and request of Defendant was inadequate for the size of Plaintiffs' dairy 
and does not function properly. 
35. Plaintiffs are entitled to revoke their acceptance of the insufficient/defective 
manure handling equipment provided by Defendant pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-
608. 
36. Plaintiffs notified Standley on June 18, 2001, that Plaintiffs were revoking 
acceptance of said manure handling equipment, and demanded a return of Plaintiffs' purchase 
money pursuant to the Idaho Code § 28-2-608. 
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37. Defendant has refused to return Plaintiffs' purchase money for the insufficient 
and/or defective manure handling equipment. 
38. As a result of the defective and/or insufficient design and installation of 
insufficient and/or defective manure handling equipment installed by Standley at the direction 
and request of Defendant at the Plaintiffs' dairy, which defective equipment was manufactured 
by Houle, and Defendant's refusal to accept Plaintiffs' rescission of said equipment, Plaintiffs 
have suffered damages in the amount of the purchase price of the manure handling equipment. 
39. In addition to the damages referenced in the preceding paragraph, Plaintiffs have 
also suffered incidental and consequential damages in excess of $35,000 for costs associated 
with modifying and renovating the defectivelinsufficient manure handling system in an attempt 
to make the same operational. 
40. Plaintiff" have been required to retain the serVIces of the law firm of White 
Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT FOUR 
Breach of Warranties 
41. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 40 above. 
42. Plaintiffs requested that Defendant engmeer, design, select equipment for and 
construct a dairy facility for a 2000+ head dairy operation. 
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43. Defendant represented to Plaintiffs that it had the expertise and knowledge to 
design and construct such a facility, and represented that it would provide the equipment for the 
same. 
44. Plaintiffs relied upon Defendant's expertise, knowledge and expenence 111 
designing and constructing the dairy facility. 
45. The design and equipment prepared, constructed and installed by Defendant is 
insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation. 
46. Defendant was aware of the intended use and purpose of the dairy facility. 
47. The equipment manufactured by Houle and installed by Standley at the direction 
and request of Defendant at the Plaintiffs' dairy does not function or operate as intended and is 
not merchantable. 
48. Defendant, having reason to know of the intended purpose of the dairy facility, 
and Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendant's skill and judgment to hire a subcontractor who could 
select and furnish a suitable system impliedly warranted the system would be fit for the intended 
purpose. 
49. Defendant breached the implied warranty of fitness for a paliicular purpose 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-315. 
50. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 28-2-314. 
51. Defendant, by representing that it could construct a manure handling system that 
would be sufficient to handle manure disposal for a 2,000+ head dairy operation, breached an 
express warranty pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-3 13. 
52. As a direct result of Defendant's breach of warranties, Plaintiffs have suffered 
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damages, including incidental and consequential damages, in an amount exceeding $150,000 the 
exact amount to be proven at trial. 
53. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the serVices of the law firm of White 
Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT FIVE 
Negligence 
54. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 53 above. 
55. Defendant owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care in the construction and 
maintenance of the dairy facility located at 10394 Melmont Road, Melba, Idaho. 
56. Defendant acted carelessly, recklessly and negligently in failing to construct and 
maintain the Plaintiffs' dairy facility in a reasonable manner, resulting in numerous defects in 
and around the dairy facility. 
57. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent actions, Plaintiffs 
have suffered property damage in an amount exceeding $150,000 to be proven with specificity at 
trial. 
58. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the serVices of the law firm of White 
Peterson, P.A. to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Plaintiffs have been required to retain the law firm of White Peterson, P.A. to prosecute 
this action and are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code 
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§§12-120 and 12-121 and any other applicable layv. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a trial composed of no less than twelve (12) persons on all issues so 
triable, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment, Order and Decree of this Court as follows: 
l. For money damages from Defendant that fully and fairly compensate Plaintiffs 
for Defendant's breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and negligence in a sum to be determined at trial exceeding $150,000. 
2. For an order allowing Plaintiffs' to rescind acceptance of the manure handling 
equipment from Defendant, and damages associated with Defendant's refusal to allow the same, 
in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. For an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and 
any other applicable law; 
4. F or such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just. 
1L--
DA TED this c-{ day of March, 2005. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By: ~ --~~~------~~---- . '\ 
Kev' . Dinius, of the Firm 
At rneys for Plaintiffs 
cm\Z:\Work\D\DeGroot Dairy, LLC\Bcitman Construction 19213.001\Verified CompJaint.doc 
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Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
John R. Kormanik 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974,5850 
jkf@whitepeterson.com 
ked@whifepeterson.com 
Jkormanik@whirepetersoncom 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, anel DeGROOT 
DAlRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
Defendant. 
-------------------------------
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV05-2277 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
PENDING ACTIONS 
COME NOW, Charles Degroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC, the above-named Plaintiffs) by 
and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of WHITE PETERSON, P.A., and hereby 
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submit their MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS. This motion is brought 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), and is supported by the Affidavit of Kevin E. 
Dinius submitted concurrently herewith along with the pleadings and record before this Court. 
On September 12, 2001, Plaintiffs Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC filed an 
action in the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, seeking the Court's determination regarding 
claims of breach of contract, recission, breach of warranties, breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against 
Defendant STANDLEY TRENCHING, lNC., dlb/a STANDLEY & CO. and claims ofrecission, 
breach of warranties and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Defendant J. 
HOULE & FILS, INC. (Ch('lries DeGroot and DeGroot, LLe v. Standley Trenching, inc., d/b/a 
Standley & Co and J Houle & Fils, Inc. Case No. CV-2001-7777) (hereinafter "Standley 
action"). In the instant action, Plaintiffs seek the Court's determination regarding claims of 
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, recission, breach of 
warranties and negligence against Defendant BEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION. Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC 
are parties in intere.st in the claims against the Defendants in the two above referenced actions. 
The Standley action involves a commOn question of fact and law pending in the 
instant matter before this Court. The instant action relates to Plaintiffs' contract with 13eltman for 
the construction of a dairy facility and Defendant Beltman's subcontract with Standley for the 
engineering, design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy 
constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. The Standley action relates to Standley's engineering, 
design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon 
County, Idaho and Standley'S distributorship of manure handling equipment manufactured by 
Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc. 
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It is in the interest of justice that this Court consolidate the instant action with the 
STandley action in order to avoid unnecessary COSTS, expense, and delay. Further, the Standley 
action arises from the same transaction or occurrence alleged by Plaintiffs in the inst~nt action. 
Therefore, consolidation is proper pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). 
DATED this 15i--day of March, 2005. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By_ .. ____ _ 
K n E. Dinius, of the Firm 
torneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the I ~y of March, 2005, a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing was served upon the following .by: 
David 1. Myers 
FILICETTl LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
5987 W. State S1., Ste. B 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
--~ 
___ Overnight Mail 
---:,.-_Hand Delivery 
>< Facsimile No. 388·0120 
~ite Peterson 
emll:\ WorkIDI!)eGrool Dairy. LL(,\Beltman Construction 192)300 [\Molion to C<)I"'()lidal~.doc 
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DAVID 1. MYERS, ISB 28 
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
5987 W. State Street, Suite B 
Post Office Box 105 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 388-0123 
Facsimile: (208) 388-0120 
djm@filicettilaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT and DeGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation, 
v. 
Defendant/Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation, 
and 1. HOULE & FILS, INC., a Canadian 
corporation, 
Third Party Defendants. 
Case No. CV05-2277 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a BELTMAN 
WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION ("Beltman"), by and through its tmdersigned counsel, for 
cause of action against the Third Party Defendants, STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a! 
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STANDLEY & CO. ("Standley") and 1. HOULE & FILS, INC. ("Houle"), a Canadian corporation, 
complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Beltman has been sued by plaintiffs Charles 
DeGroot and DeGroot Dairy, LLC ("DeGroot") for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, rescission, breach of wCLrranties, and negligence - all arising from 
subcontract work performed by Standley and equipment manufactured by Houle. 
2. Standley and/or Houle are liable to Beltman for all of the plaintiffs' claims against 
Behman. 
3. Standley, under the assumed business name of Standley & Co., offers services and 
sells manure handling equipment for dairy operations throughout Idaho, including Canyon County, 
Idaho. 
4. Houle is a Canadian corporation, on information and belief, with its principal place 
of business in the United States located in Michigan. 
5. Houle manufactures and sells manure handling equipment, which it distributes and 
sells throughout the United States, including Idaho. 
6. Standley is a "Seller" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103. 
7. Houle is a "Seller" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103. 
8. In about July or August 1999, Behman subcontracted the engineering, design, and 
installation of manure handling equipment to Standley for DeGroot's dairy being constructed in 
Canyon County, Idaho. 
9. The equipment and products sold by Standley to Beltman are "goods" within the 
meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code §§ 28-2-105 and/or 28-2-107. 
10. Beltman is a "Buyer" within the meaning ofIdaho Commercial Code § 28-2-103. 
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11. Beltman collected from DeGroot and in tum paid Standley in excess of $100,000 for 
engineering, designing, and installing manure handling equipment (including Houle equipment) at 
DeGroot's dairy. 
12. Beltman relied upon Standley'S and Houle's knowledge, representations, expertise, 
and experience to design, engineer, and install a properly functioning manure handling system for 
DeGroot's Canyon County dairy. 
13. Standley and Houle were aware of the intended purpose of the manure handling 
system, including Houle equipment, used on DeGroot's dairy. 
14. Some of the manure handling equipment installed by Standley is manufactured by 
Houle. 
15. The manure handling equipment installed at DeGroot's dairy by Standley IS 
inadequate, does not function as intended, and is not fit for its intended use. 
16. The manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle and installed at DeGroot's 
dairy does not function or work as intended. 
COUNT ONE 
Breach of Contract 
(Standley) 
17. Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 above. 
18. Beltman subcontracted with Standley for the engineering, design, and installation of 
manure handling equipment at DeGroot's dairy in Canyon County, Idaho. 
19. Beltman paid Standley in excess of $100,000 for the manure handling equipment 
and services of Standley. 
20. Standley failed to provide the equipment and services contracted and as such 
materially breached its agreement with Beltman. 
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21. Despite Beltman's and DeGroot's efforts to renovate and repair the system installed 
by Standley, the system still does not function properly andlor does not perfonn as contracted. 
22. Beltman has suffered consequential damages as a direct and proximate result of 
Standley's breach in an exact amount to be proven at trial. 
23. As a direct result of Standley's breach of contract, Beltman suffered damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000. 
24. Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law finn of Filicetti Law 
Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT TWO 
Rescission 
(Standley & Houle) 
25. Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 24 above. 
26. Standley designed and selected the materials and equipment for, and installed 
manure handling equipment at, DeGroot's Canyon County, Idaho dairy in 1999 and 2000. 
27. Substantially all of the manure handling equipment installed at DeGroot's dairy by 
Standley was manufactured by Houle. 
28. The design and equipment supplied and installed by Standley and manufactured by 
Houle was inadequate for the size of DeGroot's dairy and does not flllction properly. 
29. Beltman is entitled to revoke its acceptance of the insufficient/defective manure 
handling equipment provided by defendants pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-608. 
30. DeGroot notified Standley on June 18,2001 that they were revoking acceptance of 
said manure handling equipment, and demanded a return of the purchase money pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 28-2-608. 
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31. Standley has refused to return the purchase money for the insufficient/defective 
manure handling equipment. 
32. As a result of Standley's design and installation of insufficient/defective manure 
handling equipment at DeGroot's dairy, which defective equipment was manufactured by Houle, 
and Standley'S refusal to accept the rescission of said equipment, Beltman has suffered damages in 
the amolmt of the purchase price of the manure handling equipment. 
33. In addition to the damages referenced in the preceding paragraph, Beltman also has 
suffered incidental and consequential damages for costs associated with modifying and renovating 
the defectivelinsufficient manure handling equipment in an attempt to make the same operational. 
34. Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law 
Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT THREE 
Breach of Warranties 
(Standley and Houle) 
35. Beltman incorporates and reallege by reference all the allegations contained m 
paragraphs 1 through 34 above. 
36. Beltman, as general contractor, requested that Standley engmeer, design, select 
equipment for, and install a manure handling system for a 2000 plus head dairy operation. 
37. Standley represented to Beltman that it had the expertise and knowledge to design, 
construct, and install such a system, and represented that it would provide the equipment for the 
same. 
38. Houle represented, through the sales of its products, that its manure handling 
equipment and goods were sufficient to perform manure disposal functions for dairies of all sizes. 
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39. Beltman relied upon Standley's expertise, knowledge, and experience in designing, 
engineering, and installing the manure handling system. 
40. Beltman relied upon Houle's products to be sufficient and capable of performing the 
functions for which they are manufactured. 
41. The design and equipment prepared, constructed, and installed by Standley IS 
insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation. 
42. The equipment manufactured and designed by Houle and installed by Standley is 
insufficient for managing and disposing of manure from a 2,000 head dairy operation. 
43. Houle and Standley were aware of the intended use and purpose of the manure 
handling system and equipment. 
44. The equipment manufactured by Houle and installed by Standley at DeGroot's dairy 
does not function or operate as intended and is not merchantable. 
45. Standley, having reason to know of the intended purpose of the manure system and 
Beltman's reliance on Standley's skill and judgment to select and furnish a suitable system, 
impliedly warranted that the system would be fit for the intended purpose. 
46. Houle, having manufactured and sold manure handling equipment and knowing the 
intended use of said equipment, impliedly warranted the equipment would be fit for the intended 
purpose. 
47. Standley and Houle breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-315. 
48. Standley and Houle breached the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to 
Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-314. 
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49. Standley, by representing that its products and services would be sufficient to 
handle manure disposal for a 2,000 head dairy operation, breached the warranty of affirmation or 
promise pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-313. 
50. Houle, by holding out its products as sufficient to process manure from dairies of all 
sizes, breached the warranty of affirmation or promise pursuant to Idaho Commercial Code § 28-2-
313. 
51. As a direct result of Standley and Houle's breach of warranties, Beltman has 
suffered damages, including incidental and consequential damages, in an amount exceeding 
$150,000, with the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
52. Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law 
Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT FOUR 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(Standley) 
53. Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 52 above. 
54. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract between 
Beltman and Standley. 
55. The covenant requires Standley to act in good faith, with fairness and with honesty-
in-fact toward Beltman. As a further result of the acts, omissions, and occurrences alleged herein 
above, Standley violated, nullified, and/or significantly impaired the benefits provided to Beltman 
under the contractual relationship and thus materially breached its implied obligation to act in good 
faith, fairness, and honesty-in-fact toward Beltman. 
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56. As a direct and proximate result of Standley's conduct, as alleged herein above, 
Beltman suffered damages in the form of lost profits, lost opportunity, and other special and general 
damages in an exact amount to be proven at trial, in a sum in excess of $1 0,000. 
57. Beltman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law 
Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
COUNT FIVE 
Violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
(Standley and Houle) 
58. Beltman incorporates and realleges by reference all the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 57 above. 
59. Standley sold goods and services to Beltman, as the same are defined in the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-602(6) and (7). 
60. Houle is the seller of goods, as defined in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho 
Code § 48-602, which goods ultimately were purchased by Beltman. 
61. Standley and Houle's conduct, including without limitation, representations to 
Beltman that the goods and services were of a particular quality and standard, constituted unfair and 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade and violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, 
Idaho Code §§ 48-601 et seq. 
62. As a direct and proximate result of Standley and Houle's conduct, as alleged 
hereinabove, BeItman suffered special and general damages, in a sum in excess of $1 00,000.00, the 
exact amount to be proven at trial. 
63. BeItman has been required to retain the services of the law firm of Filicetti Law 
Office, P.A. to prosecute this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and 48-608(4). 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - PAGE 8 
06 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Beltman has been required to retain the law firm of Filicetti Law Office, P.A. to prosecute 
this action and is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-
120 and 12-121,48-608, and any other applicable law. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Beltman demands a trial composed of no less than twelve (12) persons on all issues so 
triable, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Beltman prays for the following: 
1. An award of damages against Standley for breach of contract in an amOlmt to be 
proven at trial, but which amount exceeds $150,000; 
2. An order allowing Beltman to rescind acceptance of the manure handling equipment 
from Standley and Houle, and damages associated with Standley and Houle's refusal 
to allow the same, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. An award of damages against Standley and Houle for breach of the warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose, breach of warranty of merchantability, and breach of 
warranty of promise, in an amount to be proven at trial, but which amount exceeds 
$150,000; 
4. An award of damages against Standley for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in an amount to be proven at trial; 
5. An award of damages against Standley and Houle for violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
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6. An award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121,48-601 et 
seq., and any other applicable law; and 
7. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just. 
Dated this March 21,2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE 
David 1. Myers 
Attorney for Beltman Construction, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this March 21,2005, I caused to be served a true and accurate 
copy of THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT by the method indicated below, addressed to the 
follo\\ing: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Filicetti Law Office, P.A., P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, ID 83687-7901 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
David 1. Myers 
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Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974 
Jkf@whitepeterson.com 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
BEL TMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BEL TMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CVOS-2277 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES 
TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING 
ACTIONS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT FARMS, LLC, by and 
through their attorneys of record, WHITE PETERSON, P.A., and Defendant BELTMAN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION, by and 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 1 ORIGINAL 
06 
through its attorney of record, David 1. Myers, of the law firm FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, and 
stipulate, agree and respectfully request the Court to enter its Order Consolidating Pending 
Actions. 
On September 12, 2001, Plaintiffs Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC filed an 
action in the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, seeking the Court's determination regarding 
claims of breach of contract, recission, breach of warranties, breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against 
Defendant STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a STANDLEY & CO. and claims ofrecission, 
breach of warranties and violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Defendant J. 
HOULE & FILS, INC. (Charles DeGroot and DeGroot, LLC v. Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a 
Standley & Co. and 1. Houle & Fils, Inc. Case No. CV-2001-7777) (hereinafter "Standley 
action"). In the instant action, Plaintiffs seek the Court's determination regarding claims of 
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, recission, breach of 
warranties and negligence against Defendant BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BELTMAN WELDING AND CONSTRUCTION. Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC 
are parties in interest in the claims against the Defendants in the two above referenced actions. 
The Standley action involves a common question of fact and law pending in the instant 
matter before this Court. The instant action relates to Plaintiffs' contract with Beltman for the 
construction of a dairy facility and Defendant Beltman's subcontract with Standley for the 
engineering, design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy 
constructed in Canyon County, Idaho. The Standley action relates to Standley's engineering, 
design and installation of manure handling equipment for Plaintiffs' dairy constructed in Canyon 
County, Idaho and Standley's distributorship of manure handling equipment manufactured by 
Defendant J. Houle & Fils, Inc. 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 2 
06 
h is in the interest of justice that. this Court consolidate tht instant action with the 
Standley action in order to avoid unnecessary costs, expense, and delay, Further. the Standley 
action arises from the same transaction or occurrence alleged by Plaintiffs in the instant action. 
Therefore. consolidation is proper pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Prooedure 42(a). 
DATED this r ~-r-day of April. 2005. 
DATED this __ day of April. 2005. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
------
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE. F.A. 
~---
David J. Myers. of the Firm 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB Nos.: 4601,5974 
j kf@whitepeterson. com 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a 
BEL TMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV05-2277 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
PENDING ACTIONS 
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending Actions on file herein, 
and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the instant action shall be 
consolidated with the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, matter entitled Charles DeGroot 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 1 ORIGINAL 
and DeGroot, LLC v. Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. and J Houle & Fils, Inc. 
Case No. CV-2001-7777. 
. ""-rL----
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this ! S day of April, 2005. 
/+~~~------~--r-~~~~~~~ 
. onorable Juneal C. Kerrick 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the R day of April, 2005, a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing was served upon the following by: 
David 1. Myers 
FILICETTI LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
5987 W. State S1., Ste. B 
Boise, ID 83701 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
v US Mail 
~ ___Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 388-0120 
---
k US Mail 
t 
___ Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 466-4405 
---
a~~v 
for White Peterson 
cm\Z:\ W ork\D\DeGroot Dairy, LLC\Beltman Construction 19213.001 \Order to Consolidate. doc 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE PENDING ACTIONS - 2 
William A. McCurdy 
~\1cCURDY LAW OFFICES 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: 947-7250 
Facsimile: 947-5910 
ISB # 1686 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Defendant 1. Houle & Fils, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS,LLC, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
v. 
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., a Canadian 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CHARLES DEGROOT, and DEGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation, 
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff. 
v. 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho 
corporation, and J. HOULE & FILS, 
INC. 
Third Party Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS 
AGAINST THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. ~~ : caseNo~~ 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 1 
Third-Party .L.J'-'L'-'LJlUUJlH Houle & Fils, Inc. 's ("Houle") Motion for Summary Judgment in 
Case No. CV 05-2277 having come before this Court, and the claims alleged against Third-Party 
Defendant Houle in the Third-Party Complaint having been withdrawn by Third-Party Plaintiff 
Beltman before this Court: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claims against Third-Party Defendant Houle 
contained in the Third-Party Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant Houle has properly reserved its 
right to seek an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in its defense of the Third-Party 
Complaint. 
I 
DATED this ~ day of June, 2007. 
" ' 
f ! 
By~ ____________________ __ 
Gregory Culet 
District Judge 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th~0 day of June, 2007, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Julie Klein Fischer 
Kevin E. Dinius 
WHITE PETERSON 
Canyon Park at The Idaho Center 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Michael E. Kelly ISB # 4351 
Peg M. Dougherty I§.W#6043 
o U.S. Mail 
~and-Delivered 
o Overnight mail 
o Facsimile 
o U.S. Mail 
o Hand-Delivered 
o Overnight mail 
o Facsimile 
LOPEZ & ~L NPLLC 
1100 Key Fi ncial Center 
702 West· aho Street 
Post 0 ce Box 856 
Bois, Idaho 83701 
AJP \~~ \~ ~\J \J 
Robert Lewis 
Cantrill Skinn Sullivan & King LLP 
1423 Tyrel n 
P.O. Bo 59 
Boise D 83701 
/~/ 
William A. cCurdy 
McCURD LA W OFFICES 
702 W t Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Bois, Idaho 83702 
o U.S. Mail 0t\J 
o Hand-Delivere&::::J 
o Overnight mail J 
o Facsimile 
o U.S. Mail 
o Hand-Delivered 
o Overnight mail 
o Facsimile 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT HOULE & FILS, INC. WITH PREJUDICE - 3 
Robert D. Lewis, ISB No. 2713 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
PO Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for CounterclaimantlRespondent Standley Trenching, Inc., 
d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS, LLC, 
Case Nos. CV 01-7777 ./ 
CV 05-2277 
IIV'V I.VVI/VV"; 
VS. 
Plaintiffs/Counter-
defendants/ Appellants, 
RESPONDENT/COUNTER-
CLAIMANT STANDLEY 
TRENCHING, INC.'S OBJECTION 
AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & 
FILS, INC., a Canadian corporation, 
DefendantslRespondents, 
and 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO. 
CountercIaimantl 
Respondent. 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMA."IT STANDLEY TRENCIllNG, INC.'S 
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
RECORD-l 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
BELTMA..N CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
DefendantfThird-Party 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation, 
lL'ld J. HOULE & FILS, INC. 
Third~Party Defendants. 
TO: THE lillOVE-NAMED APELLANTS AND THEIR A TIORNEY OF 
RECORD, KEVIN E. D]}'lUS, AND THE REPORTER AND CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the RespondentiCounterclaimant in 
the above-entitled proceeding hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 29, I.A.R., the addition 
of the following material to the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record. Any 
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy: 
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCIDNG, INC.'S 
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
RECORD-2 
1. Reporter's transcript: 
The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 2S(a), 
LA.R. for the hearing held on June 29,2005 
2. Clerk's Record: 
a. Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, with exhibits, dated April 18, 
2005; 
b. Memorandum of Attorney Fees, dated April 18, 2005; 
c. Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest, dated April 18, 
2005, filed by Counterclaimant; 
d. Order, dated June 6, 2005; 
e. Counterclaimant Standley Trenching Supplemental 
Memorandum Supporting Award of Fees, dated July 25, 
2005; 
f. Certain portions of the Clerk's Record from the case 
Consolidated, DeGroot v. BeItman, Case No. CV-2005-
0002277: 
(1) Civil Complaint, filed March 4, 2005; 
(2) Motion to Consolidate, filed March 18,2005; 
(3) Third-Party Complaint, filed March 22, 2005; 
(4) Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending 
Actions, filed April 19, 2005; 
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAIMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S 
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
RECORD-3 
(5) Order to Consolidate Pending Cases, filed April 19, 
2005; and 
(6) Dismissal with Prejudice, dated June 20, 2007. 
2. I certift that a copy of this request was served upon the reporter 
and clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this :> ( day of July, 2012. 
CANTRILL SKINN'ER SULLIVAN & KING, LLP 
~g~;-
Robert D. Lewis - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for RespondentlCounterc1aimant 
Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & 
Co. 
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAlMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S 
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
RECORD-4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Michael J. Hailby, II 
DINIUS LAW 
5680 E. Fran..1din Rd. - Suite 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs DeGroot & 
DeGroot Farms, LLC 
William A. McCurdy 
MCCURDY LAW OFFICES 
702 West Idaho Street - Suite 11 00 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant J Houle & Fils, 
Inc. 
M. Michael Sasser 
SASSER & INGLIS 
1902 W. Judith La.."1e - Suite 1 00 
PO Box 5880 
Boise, ID 83705 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
Standley 
Laura Whiting 
Court Reporter for the 
Honorable Gregory M. Culet 
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Judge's Copy to Chambers: 
Honorable Molly Huskey 
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
[] Facsimile: (208) 475-0101 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 344-8479 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 454-7442 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
RESPONDENT/COUNTERCLAlMANT STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC.'S 
OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
RECORD-5 
Robert D. Lewis, ISB No. 2713 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane F~.~.k_fo ~ f3.M. 
PO Box 359 
C':O 0 7 20\2 
..J .... ! Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T,CRAWFORD,OEPUTY 
Attorneys for CounterclaimantiRespondent Standley Trenching, Inc., 
d/b/a Standley & Co. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
FARMS,LLC, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs/Counter-
defendants/Appellants, 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., and J. HOULE & 
FILS, INC., a Canadian corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
and 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC., d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO. 
Counterclaimant/ 
Res ondent. 
Case Nos. CV 01-7777 
CV 05-2277 
ORDER TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
L 
CHARLES DeGROOT, and DeGROOT 
DAIRY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BELTMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
d/b/a BELTMAN WELDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION, a Washington 
corporation; 
vs. 
Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC. d/b/a 
STANDLEY & CO., an Idaho corporation, 
and J. HOULE & FILS, INC. 
Third-Party Defendants. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 29, LA.R, that the record on 
appeal be augmented by addition to the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record. The 
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy and is described in 1. below. The additional 
Clerk's Record is described in 2. below. 
1. Reporter's transcript: 
The entire reporter's transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), 
I.A.R. for the hearing held on June 29, 2005, on Motion 
for Fees and Costs and for Reconsideration. Sue Wo1f as 
Court Reporter. 
ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 
2. Clerk's Record: 
a. Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis, with exhibits, dated April 18, 2005; 
b. Memorandum of Attorney Fees, dated April 18, 2005; 
c. Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest, dated April 18, 2005, 
filed by Counterclaimant; 
d. Order, dated June 6, 2005; 
e. Counterclaimant Standley Trenching Supplemental Memorandum 
Supporting Award of Fees, dated July 25,2005; 
f. Certain portions of the Clerk's Record from the case Consolidated, 
DeGroot v. Beltman, Case No. CV-2005-0002277: 
(1) Civil Complaint, filed March 4,2005; 
(2) Motion to Consolidate, filed March 18,2005; 
(3) Third-Party Complaint, filed March 22, 2005; 
(4) Stipulation of the Parties to Consolidate Pending Actions, 
filed April 19,2005; 
(5) Order to Consolidate Pending Cases, filed April 19,2005; 
and 
(6) Dismissal with Prejudice, dated June 20, 2007. 
ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 3 
DATED this ~day of ~ ,2012. 
ORDER TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the '\ day of ~ ,2012, I served a true and 
correct copy ofthe above and foregoing instrument, by inethod indicated below, upon: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Michael J. Hanby, II 
DfNIUsLAW 
5680 E. Franklin Rd. - Suite 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Attorneys for Plaintifft DeGroot & 
DeGroot Farms, LLC 
William A. McCurdy 
McCURDY LA W OFFICES 
702 West Idaho Street - Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant J Houle & Fils, 
Inc. 
M. Michael Sasser 
SASSER & INGLIS 
1902 W. Judith Lane - Suite 100 
PO Box 5880 
Boise, ID 83705 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
Standley 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter for the 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Standley Trenching, Inc., 
d/b/a Standley & Co 
[] Facsimile: (208) 475-0101 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 344-8479 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[] Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
[] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal., 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-
Appellant, 
-vs-
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal., 
And 
Defendant-Counterclaimant -
Respondent, 
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-01-07777*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _+-_ day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
III the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal., 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-
Appellant, 
-vs-
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal., 
And 
Defendant -Counterclaimant-
Respondent, 
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., 
Defendant -Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-01-07777*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Supplemental Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full correct Supplemental Record of the pleadings 
and documents as requested and ordered. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _-'--_ day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
uUU~VJ. the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES JAY DE GROOT, etal., ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-
Appellant, 
-vs-
Supreme Court No. 39406-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STANDLEY TRENCHING, INC, etal., 
And 
Defendant -Counterclaimant-
Respondent, 
J. HOULE & FILS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Supplemental Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of 
record to each party as follows: 
Kevin E. Dinius and Michael J. Hanby II, DINUS LAW 
M. Michael Sasser, SASSER & INGLIS P.C. 
Robert D. Lewis, CANTRILL SKINNER SULLIVAN & KING, LLP 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _J--_ day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
III the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
